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MUTUAL ASSENT, NORMATIVE DEGRADATION, 
AND MASS MARKET STANDARD FORM 
CONTRACTS—A TWO-PART CRITIQUE OF 
BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW (PART I) 
STEVEN W. FELDMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Analyzing a difficult subject that pervades contract law and which is vital 
to the national economy, many scholars have written about boilerplate 
contracts. With her 2013 book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing 
Rights and the Rule Of Law, Professor Margaret Jane Radin weighs in on 
the discussion, rejecting utilitarian-welfare notions that economic 
efficiency can justify the extensive use of mass market boilerplate. In her 
main contention, Radin argues that mass market standard form contracts 
improperly degrade consumer rights in the area of voluntary consent 
(herein “normative degradation”).  
 
Although her book has achieved great renown, receiving high praise from 
prominent commentators, with plaudits such as “groundbreaking,” “a 
great achievement,” and a “masterpiece,” I respectfully suggest that the 
book has problems on both doctrinal and normative grounds. In my 
Article, I summarize the author’s argument on normative degradation, 
identify my concerns, and propose an alternative formulation. My counter 
thesis is that both statute and court decisions properly support consumer 
rights in the area of voluntary consent for mass-market standard form 
contracts.  
 
Besides being the first full-length critique of Boilerplate, this Article also 
has contributed some original observations to the secondary literature, 
most prominently identifying a division of authority on whether mutual 
assent and freedom of contract exist with adhesion contracts. I also 
provide a solution for these conflicts. Because a valid normative and legal 
argument must reflect accurate doctrinal principles, I question the views 
of those commentators praising Radin’s book as a valuable contribution to 
contract law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Analyzing a difficult subject that “pervades” contract law and which is “vital” to 
the national economy,1 scholars over the years have produced a flood of articles 
covering boilerplate contracts.2 With her 2013 book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
                                                                                                                                         
 1 E.g., Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory—Three Views of the Cathedral, U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (“Few topics in the past few decades have attracted more attention in 
contract scholarship than standard-form contracts, and rightly so.” Also stating, “there is 
hardly a more pressing challenge facing contract law.”); Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room 
for Fairness in Formalism—the Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 26 (2012) (“There is little doubt that the treatment of standard contracts is one of the 
most important puzzles facing modern contract law—and perhaps one of the most difficult.” 
Also stating, “Standard form contracts pervade the consumer arena.” and that they are “vital to 
the continued functioning of the economy.”); Michael M. Greenfield & Linda J. Rusch, Limits 
on Standard-Form Contracting in Revised Article 2, 32 U.C.C. L.J. 115, 115 (1999) (“[T]he 
use of standard-form documents pervades commercial transactions and is almost universal in 
consumer transactions.”). 
 2 E.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form 
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227 (2007) 
[hereinafter Barnes, Fairer Model]; Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts 
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Vanishing Rights And The Rule Of Law, Professor Margaret Jane Radin weighs in on 
the discussion, rejecting utilitarian-welfare notions that economic efficiency can 
justify the extensive use of mass market boilerplate. In her main contention, Radin 
argues that mass market standard form contracts improperly degrade consumer rights 
in the area of voluntary consent.3  
Although her book has achieved great renown, receiving high praise from 
prominent commentators,4 with plaudits such as “groundbreaking,” “a great 
achievement,” “eloquent and powerful,” and a “masterpiece,”5 I respectfully suggest 
that the book has doctrinal and normative problems. In my Article, I summarize the 
author’s argument, identify my concerns, and propose an alternative formulation. My 
counter thesis is that both statute and case law properly support consumer rights in 
the area of voluntary consent for mass market standard form contracts.  
A detailed overview of Radin’s thesis will aid the discussion. Radin begins by 
arguing that contracts inhabit Worlds A or B. Archetype World A contracts are 
                                                                                                                                         
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Friedrich 
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. 
REV. 629 (1943).  
 3 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (Princeton University Press 2013); id. at 19 (arguing that “normative 
degradation” has resulted in “delete[ion of] rights without consent in the name of contract”); 
id. at 29 (noting the “devolution of voluntary agreement”); id. at 82 (boilerplate contracts do 
not represent a true agreement); id. at 99-109 (arguing that utilitarian-welfare economic theory 
cannot justify boilerplate deletion of consumer rights); id. at 210 (stating boilerplate is 
“problematic on the issue of voluntary interaction”). Radin is the Henry King Ransom 
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan and William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. 
Scott Professor of Law, Emerita, at Stanford University. Radin, Margaret Jane, MICHIGAN 
LAW, http://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=mjradin. 
 4 See, e.g., David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 459, 464 (2013) (a “dense and sprawling masterpiece”); Hugh J. Treacy, Benjamin J. 
Keele & Nick Sexton, Book Review, 105 L. LIB. J. 376, 376 (2013) (“[W]e now have a 
thoughtfully crafted work of scholarship that will challenge readers to achieve new 
understandings of contract law within our print and electronic boilerplate world.” Also calling 
her book “a groundbreaking work.”); Anon., Recent Publications, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1178, 
1178 (2013) (“This insightful book engages with an omnipresent issue in the modern economy 
and will assist policymakers and courts alike in their attempts to protect consumers”); Robert 
Nagel, Devil's in the Small Print, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012 (a “sophisticated and thought-
provoking treatment”); Glenn C. Altschuler, (Not So) Fine Print, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 
2012 (“Radin makes a compelling case that boilerplate constitutes a clear and present danger 
to our core values.”); Boilerplate Symposium VII: Oren Bar-Gill on Consent Without Reading, 
CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (May 21, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/ 
2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-vii-oren-bar-gill-on-consent-without-reading-.html 
(“Professor Radin’s book is an eloquent and powerful critique of the fine-term, boilerplate 
contracts that pervade modern life. . . . Radin’s book is a great achievement.”); Boilerplate 
Symposium II: Theresa Amato on Remedies to the Problems Posed by Boilerplate, 
CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (May 14, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/ 
2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-ii-theresa-amato-on-remedies-to-the-problems-posed-by-
boilerplate.html (“Professor Radin’s masterpiece Boilerplate sets forth the intellectual 
underpinnings for an energetic movement to correct the imbalance of power between 
corporations and consumers in fine print contracts.”).  
 5 See supra note 4. 
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“bargained-for exchanges” between two parties where each party consents 
voluntarily and exercises “free choice” in a true agreement. This contract type is 
“typified” by a process of negotiation where under the ideal of “freedom of contract” 
both parties are satisfied with the deal.6 Archetype World B contracts occur without 
“actual consent” where the consumer enters into contracts “without knowing it, or at 
least without being able to do anything about it.” “World B is the world of 
boilerplate”7 and boilerplate “consistently shrinks legal rights to the vanishing 
point.” At the same time, Radin acknowledges that the law considers boilerplate to 
be a “valid method of contract formation.” 8 
Because of her contention that World B mass market boilerplate contracts lack 
the “indispensable” elements of a recognized contractual “bargain” and “voluntary” 
consumer choice, Radin posits that they are only “purported contracts.”9 She 
criticizes the “defenders” of World B contracts because they have unsuccessfully 
tried to “shoehorn [or “gerrymander”] them into the World A “paradigm of 
contractual consent.”10 She contends that these World B documents with their 
predominantly dense legalese often contain unfair terms that generally keep the 
consumer in the dark as they unduly favor the seller.11 Radin terms this alleged 
devolution of voluntary consent “normative degradation.”12  
While Radin focuses her critique of current contract law on normative grounds, 
she also recites and criticizes numerous doctrinal principles. Thus, for example, 
Radin in Chapter Seven, “Evaluating Current Judicial Oversight,” provides a twenty-
page treatment of current judicial oversight of contract law and she includes a ten- 
page doctrinal discussion in Chapter Eight, “Can Current Oversight Be Improved?”13 
Radin acknowledges in Chapter Seven that it is proper to see how well current legal 
                                                                                                                                         
 6 RADIN, supra note 3, at 3, 14. 
 7 Id. at 9, 31. Varieties of World B contracts include standardized adhesion contracts, 
offsite terms, shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses, rolling contracts, and end user license 
agreements. Id. at 10-11. 
 8 Id. at 12, 30. 
 9 Id. at 3, 8, 10-12, 20, 22, 30, 158, 213; see also id. at 81 (World B contracts are based 
“on a ‘distorted’ notion of voluntariness”). 
 10 Id. at 19, 31; see also id. at 82 (stating World B transactions use a “gerrymandered” 
concept of “agreement”). 
 11 Id. at 30, 92, 128, 163; see also id. at 83 (discussing this phenomenon with insurance 
policies). 
 12 Id. at 15-16, 19-32. Radin also argues that traditional contract theories cannot 
adequately address the problems of boilerplate contracts and that existing judicial remedies 
are largely ineffective in policing such unfair consumer transactions. Therefore, Radin 
suggests the expansion of tort law as her centerpiece reform strategy. In a complement to 
existing contract remedies, she posits a new tort, which she calls “intentional deprivation of 
basic legal rights.” This tort would also be a companion to another new tort that 
reconceptualizes abusive boilerplate as a defective “product” under the law of product 
liability. In Part II of this Article, to be published in 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (Forthcoming Fall 
2014), I address Radin’s suggested tort reforms. 
 13 Some of the black letter topics in these Chapters are unconscionability, limitation of 
remedies, the public policy defense, arbitration clauses, class actions, choice of forum clauses, 
exculpatory clauses, and software contracts. Id. 
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doctrine deals with the validity of boilerplate.14 Ironically, she leaves out a number 
of legal arguments that would have aided her cause to a degree, which I have 
included in various sections below.  
While Radin employs an accessible writing style with many interesting 
observations, her argument on normative degradation does not sufficiently address 
the core principles of mutual assent, most notably the objective theory of mutual 
obligation, the plain meaning rule, and the buyer’s duty to read the contract. In 
effect, Radin’s main doctrinal reform is to resurrect the discredited subjective 
doctrine as a general theory of voluntary assent15 as she also misstates the objective 
doctrine of mutual assent.16 Because of these inaccuracies (and others), she does not 
make her case that World B transactions are merely “purported contracts.”  
While no thoughtful proposed major shift in contract doctrine should be rejected 
out of hand, any credible new policy must be steeped in at least the fundamental 
doctrines of contract law to have any chance of adoption. No such possibility exists 
with Radin’s radical overhaul of the guiding principles of contract. Because most 
scholars agree that approximately ninety-nine percent of all contracts in the national 
economy consist largely of standard forms,17 Radin’s challenge to mass market 
standard form contracts if implemented would mean a revamping for the worse of 
the American consumer contracting system.  
In contrast, I will perform an intensive case law and statutory analysis 
emphasizing the fundamentals of contractual assent. I will also present a balanced 
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments for or against her thesis. 
Thus, in the first section of this Article, I will discuss the differences between 
boilerplate, standard form, and adhesion contracts (Radin generally uses the terms 
interchangeably). My position is that Radin does not capture the distinct legal 
difference between adhesion contracts and standard form and boilerplate agreements. 
Therefore, I will show that the law already has doctrines in place to alleviate any 
issues of voluntary assent associated with mass market adhesion contracts.  
The next major topic concerns the relation of the objective theory of mutual 
assent and mass market, standard form contracts. Subtopics will include the 
objective doctrine’s elements and underlying policy; a comparison to the discredited 
subjective theory of assent; and a critique of Radin’s view of the objective theory. 
Thereafter, I will unite these various strands of contractual assent as I address the 
objective theory and its connection to mutual assent and adhesion contracts.  
I will then address whether Radin correctly argues that adhesion contracts are 
more accurately deemed “purported contracts.” As part of this discussion, I will 
explore whether mutual assent can be present when actual, subjective agreement is 
missing. I will show that competing lines of authority have addressed whether 
legally valid consumer consent exists with adhesion contracts. I will further consider 
whether Karl Llewellyn’s theory of “blanket assent” solves this conundrum for 
contracts of adhesion.  
                                                                                                                                         
 14 Id. at 123 (“Before considering what is to be done about boilerplate, we should take a 
look at what is now being done about it.”). 
 15 See infra Part III.D.3. 
 16 See infra Part III.D. 
 17 Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1148 
(2008) [hereinafter Barnes, Objective Theory]. 
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Next, I consider the unconscionability defense to the enforcement of adhesion 
contracts. This defense is far more robust than Radin’s analysis would indicate. 
Lastly, I analyze the relation between freedom of contract and mutual assent versus 
Radin’s approach in this area. Subtopics include the elements and policy behind 
freedom of contract and the connection to adhesion contracts. Because a valid 
normative argument about the contracting system must proceed from an accurate 
statement of the key doctrinal principles, my conclusion is Radin has not succeeded 
in showing that so-called World B contracts have caused normative degradation.  
II. BOILERPLATE, STANDARD FORM, AND ADHESION CONTRACTS: IS THERE A 
DIFFERENCE? 
Radin makes numerous references to ‘boilerplate,” “standard form contracts,” 
and “contracts of adhesion.” Her usage of these concepts, however, is inconsistent 
and confusing. The reason is for the most part, Radin equates the three categories 
even though—as I will demonstrate throughout this Article—adhesion contracts are 
the only type that arguably raise concerns about World B consumer assent.  
A. Radin’s Inconsistent Usage 
The inconsistency begins with the book cover. The title of Radin’s book targets 
fine print “boilerplate”—not adhesion contracts—as the source of “vanishing rights” 
and a degradation of the “rule of law.” In many passages, she criticizes “boilerplate” 
contracts without also calling them contracts of adhesion.18 In other instances, she 
equates “boilerplate” and “standardized form” contracts19 and she does the same for 
“standardized “and “adhesion” contracts.20 Still again, she deems “boilerplate” 
contracts a subset of “contracts of adhesion”21 as she elsewhere calls a boilerplate 
contract an adhesive contract.22 In yet another instance she says that sometimes 
courts and scholars try to characterize a “boilerplate” contract as an adhesion 
contract.23 At other times, however, she singles out contracts of adhesion as the 
overriding problem area for her theory of normative degradation24 but then she says 
                                                                                                                                         
 18 E.g., RADIN, supra note 3, at 15 (“those who defend boilerplate must argue that 
boilerplate somehow meets the requirements of contract law”); id. at 16 (“In this book I will 
refer to this deletion of recipient’s rights as the problem of boilerplate rights deletion 
schemes.”); id. at 17 (“I will argue that attempts to bring boilerplate rights deletion schemes 
under the aegis of traditional contract theories by and large fail.”); see also id. at 33 (deeming 
boilerplate contracts a subset of contracts of adhesion).  
 19 E.g., id. at 8 (“This paperwork is boilerplate or, less colloquially, standardized form 
contracts.”); id. at 102 (“[I]s a boilerplate scheme of standardized terms internal to a product 
efficient?”).  
 20 E.g., id. at 10 (twice referring to “standardized adhesion contracts”); id. at 9 
(“standardized form contracts . . . have long been called contracts of adhesion”).  
 21 See id. at 33 (stating that mass market boilerplate rights deletion schemes are a type of 
contract of adhesion).  
 22 Id. at 124 (calling boilerplate contracts “so-called contracts of adhesion”). 
 23 Id. at 222 (stating the authorities “try so hard” to force boilerplate into the adhesive 
contract category).  
 24 Id. at 96 (stating that adhesion contracts have a shortfall of consent); id. at 128 (calling 
adhesion contracts the problem in unconscionability cases).  
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no problem exists with World A contracts “to some extent” being adhesion 
contracts.25 In another place, she concedes that the world of truly-bargained for 
contracts can include adhesion contracts but she adds the proposed condition that the 
above principle is true only where the contract does “[n]ot purport to rearrange one 
party’s background legal entitlements in favor of the other.”26 In another discussion 
point, she explicitly equates the three quoted concepts when she remarks,  
Standardized form contracts, when they are imposed upon consumers, 
have long been called “contracts of adhesion,” or “take it or leave it 
contracts,” because the recipient has no choice with regard to the terms. 
. . . Such paperwork is often called boilerplate, because, like the rigid 
metal used to construct steam boilers in the past, it cannot be altered.27 
Lastly, she asserts that her target for reform is “mass market boilerplate rights 
deletion schemes” that cancel “basic rights” 28 but she also heavily criticizes 
standard form and boilerplate contracts of a lesser character.29 Indeed, she states that 
“the large scope of” World B contracts are “prima facie unjustified” because of 
“normative degradation.”30 
It will be helpful to compare and contrast the established definitions of these 
three terms. “Boilerplate” means “fixed or standardized contractual language that the 
proposing party often views as relatively nonnegotiable.”31 A “standard form” 
contract is “usually a preprinted contract containing set clauses, used repeatedly by a 
business or within a particular industry with only slight additions or modifications to 
meet the specific situation.32 While Radin in a footnote does define “adhesion 
contracts” as those “which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining 
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the 
contract or reject it”33 she does not sufficiently compare adhesion contracts with 
standard form contracts and boilerplate.  
Based on these inconsistencies, the reader will be confused in understanding 
Radin’s thesis on what differences, if any, exist between the above three categories. 
Put another way, is her main concern for normative degradation either “boilerplate,” 
“standard form” or “adhesion” contracts, or some combination of these concepts? 
Also, how is her classification consistent with the cases about the three categories 
and the applicable distinctions? 
The upshot is that even taking as a given Radin’s theory that certain mass market 
consumer contracts cause normative degradation, Radin’s view of World B contracts 
                                                                                                                                         
 25 Id. at 210. 
 26 Id. One example of an excluded contract in this category, Radin says, would be an 
insurance policy. Id.  
 27 Id. at 9.  
 28 Id. at 212. 
 29 See, e.g., id. at 8-11. 
 30 Id. at 97. 
 31 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 198 (9th ed. 2009).  
 32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 373 (9th ed. 2009). 
 33 RADIN, supra note 3, at 277 n.10 (quoting California case law). 
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sweeps too broadly and inconsistently. The reason is that she has sometimes 
included in this classification contracts that are merely standard form or boilerplate, 
which instruments under accepted legal definitions have fewer issues than adhesion 
contracts regarding voluntary assent.34 As a result, her thesis is confusing on the 
nature of the instruments she finds questionable.  
B. Radin on Adhesion Contracts 
A related flaw in Radin’s mingling of the three categories is her minimal 
discussion of the legal elements and objectives of adhesion contracts. A careful 
examination of this vehicle and comparison to boilerplate and standard form contract 
will show why adhesion contracts are the only contract type under World B that 
might inherently call the consumer’s assent into question. 
Citing a leading California Supreme Court decision, the California District Court 
of Appeals in Powell v. Central Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.35 fully explained 
adhesion contracts: 
The term ‘contract of adhesion’ refers to ‘a standardized contract prepared 
entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; 
such a contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the 
draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the 
second party on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, without opportunity for 
bargaining and under such conditions that the ‘adherer’ cannot obtain the 
desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement.  
Adhesion contracts exist with consumer transactions whereby the merchant 
offers a form contract to the public on a “mass basis.”36 Here, “The dominant party 
knows that the other would not [necessarily] accept the term, and thus [the dominant 
party] employs the practices of minute print, unintelligible legalese, or high pressure 
sales technique.”37 Accordingly, adhesion contracts focus on the conduct of both 
parties where one party is the injured party and other is the injuring party. The 
weaker party must have had “no reasonable choice” but to sign the contract and the 
merchant seeking enforcement must have narrowed the consumer’s choices of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 34 See infra Part II.B. Radin has taught a class at the Michigan Law School entitled, 
“Boilerplate: Legal Regulation of Adhesion Contracts.” http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
CurrentStudents/Registration/ClassSchedule/Pages/AboutClass.aspx?term=1920&classnbr=10
171. Her own course-title focus on “adhesion contracts” confirms my view that she should 
have clearly and consistently identified adhesion contracts as the real area of potential 
concern. 
 35 Powell v. Cent. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 130 Cal. Rptr. 635, 641 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976) (quoting Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (Cal. 1962)).  For 
other jurisdictions relying upon this definition, see, for example, SI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nielsen 
Media Research, 181 F. Supp. 2d 404, 413 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Abbott v. Amoco Oil Co., 
619 N.E.2d 789, 794 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993); Waltrip v. Osage Million Dollar Elm Casino, 290 
P.3d 741, 745 n.2 (Okla. 2012). 
 36 Burgess Constr. Co. v. State, 614 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Alaska 1980). 
 37 Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1180 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
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first party by “illegitimate means.”38 More specifically, the weaker party needing the 
goods or services ordinarily is in no position to “[s]hop around for better terms, 
either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or 
artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses.”39 Therefore, implicit with 
an adhesion contract is that the weaker party is unable to obtain the benefit of the 
bargain offered from an acceptable source.40 
Radin only hints at other points of comparison as between adhesion contracts, 
boilerplate, and standard form instruments. Under the case law, numerous 
differences do exist among these contract types. First, when there is a standard form, 
small font contract, but the facts do not call the consumer’s consent into question, 
the contract is not automatically adhesive.41 Fine print alone is not legally 
objectionable; it is only when coupled with other circumstances making 
comprehension difficult, such as “maze of fine print” hiding key terms, that there is 
potential for a legally viable objection.42 Second, “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts 
under various decisions are not necessarily adhesion contracts—the reason is an 
adhesion contract requires proof that the stronger party has limited the weaker 
party’s liabilities or duties and the latter has experienced coercive economic pressure 
to sign.43 Third, numerous cases have ruled that a boilerplate contract is not 
automatically adhesive.44 Fourth, a mere inequality in bargaining power does not 
                                                                                                                                         
 38 Id. at 1174, 1179-80. For a discussion of the origins of adhesion contracts in contract 
law doctrine, see Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35-36 (Mich. 2005). 
 39 Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971). 
 40 Compare Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 976 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2005)), with 
Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 588 (1933) (“he who is under 
economic necessity is not really free”). 
 41 Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 397 (5th Cir. 2006); Rozeboom v. Nw. Bell 
Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241, 242 (S.D. 1984) (simply because a contract is standardized and 
preprinted does not make it an adhesive contract). 
 42 Edart Truck Rental Corp. v. B. Swirsky & Co., 579 A.2d 133, 137 (Conn. Ct. App. 
1990). 
 43 King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 226, 232 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Jones v. 
Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 375 (Colo. 1981) (even though a contract is a printed form and offered 
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis does not make it an adhesion contract). With an adhesion 
contract, “the offeree finds himself virtually compelled by economic necessity to accept a 
contractual term that he actively opposes, or would actively oppose if he thought opposition 
not futile.” Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1179 (3d 
Cir. 1979). This reference to economic necessity should not be overconstrued, however, 
because otherwise an adhesive contract could be the same as a contract procured through 
economic duress. See Wassink v. Hawkins, 763 P.2d 971, 973-74 (Alaska 1988) (stating 
elements of economic duress). 
 44 See St. Jude Medical, S.C., Inc. v. Biosense Webster, Inc., No. 12-621 ADM/AJB, 2012 
WL 1576141, at *3 (D. Minn. May 4, 2012) (citing Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met–Fab 
Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 889-90 (Minn. 1982) (boilerplate not always adhesive)); Adams 
v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 700 (10th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a claim 
that an arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion simply because it contained 
boilerplate language); Hardin v. Morningside of Jackson, L.L.C., 425 F. Supp. 2d 898, 904 
(W.D. Tenn. 2006) (stating that although “adhesion contracts typically involve boilerplate, 
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result in an adhesion contract.45 “Although some authors have used the terms 
‘standard-form agreement’ and “contract of adhesion” interchangeably, adhesion 
contracts are a special type of standard form agreement.46 Based on the above 
principles, an adhesion contract is not per se unenforceable.47  
The next issue pertains to Radin’s critique that boilerplate results in 
“exploitation” of consumers.48 While “exploitation” is never defendable,49 she 
underplays a basic premise of our market economy that parties (including merchants) 
are entitled to take “aggressive positions” within the bounds of the law to maximize 
the benefits they believe they are entitled to receive under their contracts. After all, 
as an Alabama Supreme Court Justice cogently observed, “That is what parties to 
contracts are expected to do.”50 In this same vein, the law generally does not seek to 
restructure the American economy but strives to work within it and to help the 
players flourish.  
Radin appears to agree with the right of parties to take aggressive bargaining 
positions when she says solving wealth disparity in the United States is not a 
problem for the Constitution, statute or contract law.51 Therefore, valid economic 
justifications can motivate a seller to protect an enforceable adhesion contract; 
                                                                                                                                         
take-it-or-leave-it terms offered by a ‘superior’ party, the ‘distinctive’ indicia of a true 
adhesion contract is that ‘the weaker party has no realistic choice as to [the] terms’”); City of 
Gettysburg v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 429, 452 (2005) (even where the contract language 
was boilerplate, “[t]his fact alone is not enough to support a claim of adhesion”); Rassa v. 
Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (D. Md. 1998) (same); Bevere v. 
Oppenheimer & Co., 862 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (D.N.J. 1994) (same). 
 45 Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2002). 
 46 Kaustuv M. Das, Comment, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and 
Browsewrap Agreements and the “Reasonably Communicated” Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 
484 (2002). 
 47 Byrd v. SunTrust Bank, No. 2:12-cv-02314-JPM-cgc, 2013 WL 3816714, at *7 (W.D. 
Tenn. July 22, 2013); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 342 n.20 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 2001).  
 48 RADIN, supra note 3, at 85, 151, 152. 
 49 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (9th ed 2009) (defining term as “the act of taking 
unjust advantage of another for one's own benefit”). 
 50 Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. State, 901 So. 2d 1, 15 n.12 (Ala. 2004) (Houston, J., 
concurring specially); see also Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 
132 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Parties to contracts are entitled to seek, and retain, personal advantage; 
striving for that advantage is the source of much economic progress.”); Fountain Leasing, 
LLC v. Kloeber, No. 3:12-cv-317, 2013 WL 4591622, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2013) 
(“[P]arties engaged in a commercial transaction pursue their own self-interest and understand 
and expect that the parties with whom they are dealing are doing likewise.”); 1 E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.2 at 6 (4th ed. 2004) (in a market economy, 
each party to a contract “[s]eeks to maximize its own economic advantage on terms tolerable 
to the other party”). 
 51 RADIN, supra note 3, at 152.  
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nothing inappropriate will result when a merchant simply drafts terms that will 
strongly ensure that he or she would prevail in any litigation with a buyer.52  
Lastly, Radin does not disclose that some jurisdictions have different elements in 
their definition of adhesion contracts. In Maryland, for example, the services under 
an adhesion contract are usually “essential in nature,” such as education, housing, 
hospital, and public utility services.53 In the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, an adhesion contract exists only where the drafter uses “high 
pressure tactics” or “deceptive language in the contract” or where the contract is 
“unconscionable.”54 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a 
contract may be adhesive “even if the customer has a meaningful choice as to service 
providers.”55 Tennessee decisions require proof that the consumer’s refusal to sign 
would have resulted in some detriment besides the consumer’s inability to obtain 
goods or services from the particular merchant.56 The United States Court of Federal 
Claims requires the element for the plaintiff’s burden of proof that he or she was not 
given an opportunity for input or negotiation.57 Under Colorado law, an adhesion 
contract is one “forced upon an unwilling and often unknowing public.”58 In a final 
example, Minnesota adds to the multi-factor analysis the “business sophistication” of 
each party.59 Ultimately, while a prominent commentator observes that “Probably 
most contracts of adhesion are simple and reasonable,”60 courts are divided on 
whether adhesion contracts are intrinsically improper.61 Given these nuances among 
                                                                                                                                         
 52 Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 282 (Ariz. 1987) (citing Rakoff, 
supra note 2, at 1237); see also Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: 
Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 149 (2005) (“Contracts of adhesion are 
no longer merely a device to cut costs in a mass marketing situation. They are used for their 
substantive role of avoiding disagreements and imposing terms on the other party.”). 
 53 Seigneur v. Nat’l Fitness Inst., Inc., 752 A.2d 631, 638 (Md. Ct. App. 2000). In some 
courts, a contract is not adhesive where the subject matter does not satisfy a public necessity 
and the items can be obtained elsewhere. Siebert v. Amateur Athletic Union of U.S., Inc., 422 
F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1040 (D. Minn. 2006). 
 54 Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997); accord Sablosky v. Edward S. 
Gordon Co., Inc., 535 N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. 1989). 
 55 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 56 Patteson v. McAdams Tax Advisory Grp., LLC, No. 09-2085 Ma/P, 2010 WL 711161, 
at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2010) (citing cases). 
 57 City of Gettysburg v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 429, 452 (2005).  
 58 Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981).  
 59 Interfund Corp. v. O’Byrne, 462 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 60 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 348 n.3 (6th ed. 2009). 
 61 Compare Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. Super. 1985) 
(“The phrase ‘contract of adhesion’ and the evil it suggests have been familiar for many 
years.”), with Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1997) (adhesion 
contracts “offend[] basic notions of civility and fair play”), and Powell v. Cent. Cal. Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Assn., 130 Cal. Rptr. 635, 642 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“There is nothing sinful or 
illegal about a contract of adhesion.”), and State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 273 
(W. Va. 2002) (the question for courts is distinguishing “good adhesion contracts which 
should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which should not”). 
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the jurisdictions, care must be taken to avoid implying that the elements of an 
adhesion contract are a monolithic concept.  
Conceding the merchant’s significant advantages with adhesion contracts, are 
there any palliatives for consumers? The answer is that while courts expect and 
allow contracting parties to maximize their bargaining positions with adhesion 
contracts, the courts also apply a counterweight to this principle to protect the 
consumer against potential merchant overreaching. Most courts are quite sensitive to 
possible merchant misuse of adhesion contracts, which is why almost all courts 
scrutinize contracts of adhesion “skeptically.”62 Thus, a federal district court has 
observed that even if an arbitration agreement were adhesive, the court would not 
necessarily invalidate the agreement, but rather would give it “greater scrutiny.”63 
Along similar lines, a case from California provides that where a contract limits the 
duties or liability of the stronger party, a court will not enforce it against the weaker 
party absent “plain and clear notification” of the terms and the adherent’s 
“understanding consent.”64 The above rules of judicial skepticism are in addition to 
the consumer-friendly doctrine that ambiguities in an adhesion contract are 
construed in favor of the weaker party.65 Therefore, Radin’s thesis does not address 
                                                                                                                                         
 62 Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1185-86 (Cal. 1976); Sekeres v. 
Arbaugh, 508 N.E.2d 941, 946-47 (Ohio. 1987) (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing decisions); 
Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 52 n.13 (Mich. 2005) (Kelly, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases applying rule of skepticism). Contra id. at 42 (majority opinion) 
(“Regardless of whether a contract is adhesive, a court may not revise or void the 
unambiguous language of the agreement to achieve a result that it views as fairer or more 
reasonable”).  
This Article unreservedly agrees that the law should not support unethical or improper 
practices and endorses the common statement that courts should examine adhesion contracts 
with greater scrutiny. 
 63 Wilkerson ex rel. Wilkerson v. Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see 
also First Ala. Bank v. First State Ins. Co., No. 83-G-2082-S, 1988 WL 192452, at *11 (N.D. 
Ala. May 26, 1988) (adhesion contracts “[h]ave always been subjected to careful judicial 
scrutiny to avoid injury to the public”); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 
228 (W.Va. 2012) (“A contract of adhesion should receive greater scrutiny than a contract 
with bargained-for items to determine if it imposes terms that are oppressive, unconscionable 
or beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person.”); Martin v. Educ. Testing Serv., 
Inc., 431 A.2d 868, 875 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1981) (“a contract of adhesion must at very least be 
closely scrutinized by the court to determine its reasonableness”), overruled on other grounds 
sub nom. Brady v. Dept. of Pers., 693 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1997). 
 64 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see also 
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 573 (Cal. 2007) (“Ordinary contracts of adhesion, 
although they are indispensable facts of modern life that are generally enforced contain a 
degree of procedural unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and ‘bear within 
them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching.’”). 
 65 See New Castle Cnty. v Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646-47 (E.D. Va. 2006); In re 
Shirel, 251 B.R. 157, 161 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2000). Radin has also overlooked that for 
adhesion contracts, courts impart a heightened merchant-implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Thus, for the most common form of adhesion contracts, i.e. the insurance policy, one 
court has observed: 
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several crucial interpretive doctrines favoring consumers regarding judicial review of 
adhesion contracts.  
The foregoing discussion has shown that adhesion contracts, and not boilerplate 
or standard form contracts, should be the true focus for whether the consumer in 
World B has given effective consent. Adhesion contracts are the only contract type 
that requires proof of economic pressures,66 which could conceivably call into 
question the voluntariness of the consumer’s assent. Nevertheless, because United 
States jurisdictions’ understanding of adhesion contracts has variations, the different 
versions could lead to different outcomes on whether particular parties have formed 
a bona fide mutual assent. Radin’s inconsistent emphasis throughout her book on 
boilerplate or standard forms instead of adhesion contracts and her failure to account 
for the differing judicial formulations of adhesion contracts create an unreliable 
doctrinal foundation for her theories of normative degradation.  
C. The Utility of Boilerplate (and Adhesion) Contracts  
To her credit, Radin does mention to an extent the recognized benefits of 
boilerplate (which in this section includes standard form and adhesion contracts). 
Thus, echoing numerous decisions,67 she acknowledges that “Yet, if all attempts to 
use boilerplate were to be declared unenforceable, that would cause a considerable 
disruption of current commercial practice.”68 Further, she admits that “In the abstract 
standardization is neither good nor bad,” and she concedes that a standardized form 
can promote knowledge and ease of use, reduce uncertainty, and lower transaction 
costs for all parties.69 She also cites with approval the example of an insurance 
policy and how it facilitates commercial transactions.70  
Nevertheless, Radin consistently argues that boilerplate contracts are “harmful” 
to consumers.71 While it is always possible for any contract type to produce failed or 
unfair transactions, the best argument in favor of mass market boilerplate is the 
courts’ conclusion that these agreements are “very useful” and have “advantages” 
that benefit merchants, consumers and the national economy.72 As stated by the 
                                                                                                                                         
In all insurance contracts, particularly where the language expressing the extent of the 
coverage may be deceptive to the ordinary layman, there is an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing[—the “utmost good faith”—]that the insurer will not do 
anything to injure the right of its policyholder to receive the benefits of his contract.  
Hall v. Liberty Ins. Corp., No. 3:13-cv-206-TAV-HBG, 2013 WL 6571928, at * 7 (E.D. Tenn. 
Dec. 13, 2013) (quoting decisions).  
 66 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.  
 67 “[S]ince the bulk of contracts signed in this country, if not every major Western nation, 
are adhesion contracts, a rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be 
completely unworkable.” Pingley v. Perfection Plus Turbo-Dry, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 544, 550 
(W. Va. 2013); accord Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 68 RADIN, supra note 3, at 15, 42.  
 69 Id. at 42. 
 70 Id. at 15; see also id. at 42 (similar observations). 
 71 Id. at 85, 214; see also id. at 85 (boilerplate “unjustly treat[s]” citizens).  
 72 See infra notes 74-75. 
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South Carolina Court of Appeals, “Form contracts obviously serve a very useful 
purpose in commerce.”73 Also, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has cited the improvements to the contracting system brought about by 
boilerplate: “Contractual language serves its functions only if enforced consistently. 
This is one of the advantages of boilerplate, which usually has a record of 
predictable interpretation and application.”74 Courts also recognize the financial 
advantages to consumers; the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has observed that standard forms “[r]educe transactions costs and benefit consumers 
because, in competition, reductions in the cost of doing business show up as lower 
prices.”75 Lastly, the American Law Institute, the promulgator of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and hardly a radical change agent, concurs regarding the 
benefits of boilerplate contracting: “Standardization of agreements serves many of 
the same functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a 
system of mass production and distribution. . . . Operations are simplified and costs 
reduced, to the advantage of all concerned.76 Thus, it can be seen that, as compared 
with Radin, many authorities give far more emphasis to the systemic benefits of 
boilerplate. 
Radin also would have greatly improved her book had she responded in more 
depth to those commentators with a different perspective on the nature and utility of 
boilerplate. An excellent example of this missed opportunity is her failure to engage 
Jason Scott Johnston, who wrote a well-known 2006 article on boilerplate in the 
Michigan Law Review. In his article, which predates Radin’s book, Johnston 
challenged the notion commonly accepted by judges, attorneys and legal academics 
that standard-form contracts have eliminated bargaining in consumer contracts.77 
Relying on empirical studies in various industries, Johnston argued that standard-
form contracts “[f]acilitate bargaining and are a crucial instrument in the 
establishment and maintenance of cooperative relationships between firms and their 
customers.”78 Johnston studied some common forms of consumer contracts, 
                                                                                                                                         
 73 Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 906 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
 74 Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 75 Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) (emphasis supplied) 
(approved in Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1049 n.3 (D.C. App. 1996)); see 
also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2008) 
(noting that standard form contracts “enable a judicial interpretation of one contract to serve 
as an interpretation of all contracts” as they “simplify planning and administration and make 
superior drafting skills more widely available”).  
 77 Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-
Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006); see also id. at 858 (“On this view, which I elaborate below, firms 
use clear and unconditional standard-form contract terms not because they will insist upon 
those terms, but because they have given their managerial employees the discretion to grant 
exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis.”). Radin contributed an 
article to the same Michigan Law Review issue, and even cited Johnston’s article in her piece, 
so it cannot be said she was unaware of the Johnston article. See Margaret Jane Radin, 
Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1223, 1228 n.17 (2006).  
 78 Johnston, supra note 77, at 858. 
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including hospital bills, consumer credit cards, home-mortgage and home-equity 
lending, the rent-to-own industry and retail sales return policies.79 Other writers 
similarly rely on empirical arguments that mass market boilerplate contracts are 
much more negotiable in fact than they are in theory.80 Radin does not directly 
contest these empirical findings but is content merely to inject a side issue that such 
practices can hide discriminatory or anticompetitive behavior.81 
The point remains that while Radin is correct that boilerplate contracts often 
strongly favor the seller (even as empirical research indicates that this tilt is absent in 
the online retail environment82) whether a contract strongly favors one party over 
another is not strong evidence of normative degradation. The United States free 
market economy would be diminished and become inefficient if the law disallowed 
parties from maximizing their perceived interests through hard, but fair, 
bargaining.83 Thus, courts accept the principle that “[i]ndividuals usually benefit 
when left free to maximize their own interests in negotiating the terms of a 
contract.”84  
                                                                                                                                         
 79 Id. at 857. 
 80 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (arguing that based on reputational 
concerns, some merchants selectively enforce standard form contracts against purchasers). 
 81 RADIN, supra note 3, at 229. 
 82 Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail 
Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 993 (2008) (“Retailers have rarely designed interfaces 
to obtain assent to their posted terms, and the posted terms rarely include harsh pro-retailer 
terms.”); id. at. 998 (“Perhaps the most surprising finding is that arbitration clauses appear in 
less than one-tenth of the contracts (only 44 of 500 retailers).”); id. at 999 (jury trial waivers 
found in less than one percent of the contracts (6 of 500 retailers)). These findings contradict 
Radin’s broad generalization that “boilerplate consistently shrinks legal right to the vanishing 
point.” RADIN, supra note 3, at 30. The only significant support Radin musters for unfairness 
in standard form contracts is the assertion that in the telecom consumer credit and financial 
industries, avoiding class actions is the principal purpose of many arbitration clauses. Id. at 
280 n.26. 
 83 “[H]ard bargaining . . . is acceptable, even desirable, in our economic system.” Rich & 
Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 84 Kakaes v. George Washington Univ., 790 A.2d 581, 585 (D.C. App. 2002). Prominent 
commentators have noted that criticisms of boilerplate are often economically unsound 
because they misconstrue market operations. Professor Douglas Baird, former Dean of the 
University of Chicago Law School, has observed: 
Legal academics too often exaggerate the dangers of boilerplate. They become 
completely caught up in a framework in which everything reduces to the rights of A 
against B, a framework that is out of touch with how mass markets work. To be sure, 
sellers can engage in advantage-taking with respect to boilerplate, but they can do this 
with other product attributes as well. 
. . . . 
[T]he focus should not be on how boilerplate operates in a world in which we assume 
A and B ought to negotiate with each other, but on how the market as a whole is best 
regulated in an environment in which discrete arms-length negotiations are 
impossible. 
Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 934, 935 (2006). 
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III. MASS MARKET STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS AND THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF 
MUTUAL ASSENT 
Part III covers the general topic of the objective theory of mutual assent for 
boilerplate and standard form contracts. A frequently cited working definition of the 
“objective theory” of contracting assent is that “Under the objective theory of mutual 
assent followed in all jurisdictions, a contracting party is bound by the apparent 
intention he outwardly manifests to the other contracting party. To the extent that his 
real secret intention differs therefrom, it is entirely immaterial.”85  
After explaining the objective standard, Part III will set forth the doctrine’s 
underlying policy and compare it with the discredited subjective theory as an 
overarching concept of mutual assent. Thereafter, Part III will critique Radin’s view 
of the objective standard in some key areas. The analysis below will prove that 
Radin, in considering mass market consumer contracts, gives insufficient weight to 
the objective theory of mutual assent and its sound policies. Part IV will address the 
related topic of adhesion contracts and mutual assent.  
A. The Objective Theory Explained 
Courts commonly state that tThe primary purpose in contract construction is to 
ascertain and give effect to the parties’ mutual intent” 86 but this statement should not 
be taken literally. The parties to most contracts give both actual and apparent assent 
and yet both processes need not be present.87 The pivotal point is whether the parties 
have joined in objective mutual assent. 
Under the objective doctrine, one party to a contract may rely on the outwardly 
manifested assent demonstrated by the other party's signature (or his other words and 
actions signifying agreement) regardless of the latter’s unexpressed subjective 
intentions.88 “The true test is not what the parties to the contract intended it to 
mean.”89 Case law provides, “The only intent of the parties to a contract which is 
essential is an intent to say the words and do the acts which constitute their 
                                                                                                                                         
 85 In re McLean Indus., Inc., 90 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Cohn v. 
Fisher, 287 A.2d 222, 224 (N.J. Super. Div. 1972)). 
 86 E.g., Ecorp, Inc. v. Rooksby, 746 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
Hutchinson, Shockey, Erley & Co. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 644 N.E.2d 
1228, 1231 (Ind.1994)); accord Wonderland Shopping Ctr. Venture Ltd. P’ship v. CDC 
Mortg. Capital, Inc., 274 F.3d 1085, 1092 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17, cmt. c (1981). 
 88 Newkirk v. Village of Steger, 536 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2008); D’Antuono v. Serv. 
Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 323 (D. Conn. 2011) (signature usually conclusive evidence 
of consent); Wash. Greensview Apartment Assocs. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 295 P.3d 284, 
292 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013);11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 31:4 (4th ed. 
2004) (also stating it is not the real intent, but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing 
that controls); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 481 (2002) (“For many people, a signature denotes a 
binding commitment and is the essence of a contract.”). 
 89 Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 
1992). 
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manifestation of assent;”90 agreement does not “consist of harmonious intentions or 
states of mind.”91 Accordingly, it will suffice that the one party had a reason to 
believe that the second party had the requisite intention with no further requirement 
that the first party had an actual belief regarding the second party’s assent. 92 So long 
as one party’s outward manifestation of assent is sufficient to create the second 
party’s “reasonable reliance,” contracting consent will be found.93 In essence, the 
“objective” element of this doctrine means that  
A party cannot escape the natural and reasonable interpretation which 
must be put on what he says and does by showing that his words were 
used and his acts done with a different and undisclosed intention. . . . It is 
not the secret purpose, but the expressed intention, which must govern in 
the absence of fraud or mutual mistake. A party is estopped to deny that 
the intention communicated to the other side was not his real intention.94 
Next, it is worth mentioning one of the most enduring phrases in all of contract 
law, the “meeting of the minds.” The modern case law still frequently refers to 
mutual assent as constituting a “meeting of the minds,”95 but the better approach 
correctly calls this usage “disfavored” 96 and even “inaccurate and misleading.”97 As 
Farnsworth explains, this metaphor has a “faulty etymology” because early 
authorities “wrongly supposed” that the word “agreement’ was derived from the 
Latin agregatio mentium, a meeting of the minds.98 Thus, the better view rejects this 
description because some courts seem to imply erroneously that parties must have 
the same subjective understanding of the contract.99 The discerning decisions further 
                                                                                                                                         
 90 Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 190 (D.C. App. 2009). “The making of a 
contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of 
two sets of external signs—not the parties having meant the same thing but on their having 
said the same thing.’” Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957) (citing Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897)). 
 91 Devlin v. Ingrum, 928 F.2d 1084, 1095 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Lilley v. Gonzales, 417 
So.2d 161, 163 (Ala. 1982)). 
 92 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 210 (3d ed. 2004). 
 93 McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 (Wyo. 1991); see also 1 E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 210 (3d ed. 2004). 
 94 Woburn Nat’l. Bank v. Woods, 89 A. 491, 493 (N.H. 1914). 
 95 E.g., Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 75 (1st Cir. 2013); Potts Constr. Co. v. N. Kootenai 
Water Dist.,116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) (“The minds of the parties must meet as to all the 
terms before a contract is formed.”). 
 96 Shea v. Riley, 954 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997); 1 RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:1 (4th ed. 2007). 
 97 Holt v. Swenson, 90 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. 1958). 
 98 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (3d. ed. 2004).  
 99 Baker v. Elmwood Distrib., Inc., 940 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir.1991) (citing Midland 
Hotel v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 515 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ill. 1987)).  
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caution that this phrase is a “much-abused metaphor” that should be “abandoned for 
purposes of clarity.”100  
In sum, the objective standard of mutual assent closely aligns with the plain 
meaning rule of contract interpretation. The latter doctrine requires that “where the 
language employed in a contract is unambiguous, a court shall give effect to its plain 
meaning.”101 In so doing, the majority of courts have no need either for “further 
construction” or consideration of “extrinsic evidence.”102 Thus, as will be explained 
in more detail below, the objective standard expresses high confidence that the 
unambiguous words the parties have chosen are the most reliable proof of their 
contemporaneous intent at contract formation. 
B. The Objective Theory’s Underlying Policy 
Radin fails to discuss in any depth the policy for the objective theory. 
Understanding its rationale, however, clarifies why this doctrine has succeeded as 
the prevailing mode for ascertaining the existence of mutual assent even for 
standardized or boilerplate agreements.  
The objective test protects the “fundamental principle” of the security of 
contracting actions as it maintains a workable system of commerce and economic 
exchange.103 The goal of the objective test is that by requiring evidence beyond 
litigation-motivated, post hoc descriptions of the parties' earlier states of mind, the 
judicial system is able to increase the reliability of its decision making process in 
contract litigation.104 A related policy is the objective test allows the first party to 
have little or no reason to fear that the second party may thereafter void the contract 
                                                                                                                                         
 100 State v. Heisser, 249 P.3d 113, 120 (Or. 2011); see also Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local 
No. 458-3M, 20 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir.1994) (“The premise—that a ‘meeting of the minds’ is 
required for a binding contract—obviously is strained.”). 
 101 Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620, 630 (Md. Ct. App. 2001).  
 102 Griggs v. Evans, 43 A.3d 1081, 1087 (Md. Ct. App. 2012); see also Barron Bancshares, 
Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“If the terms of a contract are 
clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain meaning—extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissible to interpret them.”); infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (explaining 
plain meaning rule).  
In construing mutual assent, a minority of courts give more weight to the circumstances 
surrounding the contract terms. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784 (Wash. 
2004) (“[U]nder the ‘context rule’ a court determines ‘the intent of the parties by viewing the 
contract as a whole, which includes the subject matter and intent of the contract, examination 
of the circumstances surrounding its formation, subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, the 
reasonableness of the respective interpretations advanced by the parties, and statements made 
by the parties during preliminary negotiations, trade usage, and/or course of dealing.’”). For 
additional discussion of this “context rule,” see Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning 
Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent and Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 
94-111 (2013).  
 103 Barnes, Objective Theory, supra note 17, at 1129; see also Brian A. Blum, Assent and 
Accountability in Contract: An Analysis of Objective Standards in Contemporary Contract 
Adjudication, 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1984) (extensive analysis).  
 104 Lawrence M. Solan, Contract As Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 380 (2007). 
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by his claiming either a failure to read or a subjective misunderstanding of the 
agreement.105 As Grant Gilmore has opined,  
[I]f “the actual state of the parties minds” is relevant, then each litigated 
case must become an extended factual inquiry into what was “intended,” 
“meant,” “believed” and so on. If, however, we can restrict ourselves to 
the “externals” . . ., then the factual inquiry will be much simplified and in 
time can be dispensed with altogether as the courts accumulate precedent 
about recurring types of permissible and impermissible “conduct.”106  
Because it emphasizes external, ascertainable events regarding the deal, the 
objective test upholds the value of unbiased adjudication and readily captures the 
parties’ manifested intent before a dispute. Various courts have observed that absent 
a facial ambiguity, the contract’s actual language is the “best evidence of the intent 
of the parties” and therefore the “plain meaning is controlling.”107 Indeed, under the 
strict version of the objective theory, the courts examining mutual assent are 
generally limited in their evidentiary scope of review to the four corners of an 
unambiguous document.108 
In essence, the objective theory of contracts comports with the need and reason 
for voluntary assent. The rule preserves the ideal of individual autonomy because the 
coercive power of the state allows the parties to exercise their personal freedom with 
the result that“[c]onsent is the human vehicle for exercising freedom or 
autonomy.”109 Also, the objective doctrine enhances the freedom of contract because 
the law allows parties the increased ability to manage their business relationships 
“[b]y limiting operative manifestations to those that are received and known by the 
parties to the negotiation.”110 Lastly, it protects the parties’ reliance and expectation 
                                                                                                                                         
 105 Allied Office Supplies Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. Conn. 2003); 
see also Apeldyn Corp. v. Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013) (statements 
of a party’s subjective intent that were not expressed or communicated at the time the contract 
was formed are not permissible evidence of intent).  
 106 GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 42 (1974). 
 107 See Acceleration Nat'l Serv. Corp. v. Brickell Financial Servs. Motor Club, Inc., 541 
So.2d 738, 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 548 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1989); see also Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The strongest 
external sign of agreement between contracting parties is the words they use in their written 
contract.”). Therefore, the cases say “[e]xtrinsic evidence of intent is admissible only if the 
contract is ambiguous on its face.” Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 
283 (Tex. 1996); accord Press Mach. Corp. v. Smith R.P.M. Corp., 727 F.2d 781, 784 (8th 
Cir.1984). These decisions further exemplify the strong connection between the objective 
theory and the plain meaning rule.  
 108 “[T]he objective theory of contracts . . . limits the court to the four corners of [a clear 
and definite] contract in determining the intention of the parties” In re Federated Dept. Stores, 
Inc., 240 B.R. 711, 722 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) (calling this position “the majority view”); 
see also Munro v. Beazer Home Corp., No. U608-03-081, 2011 WL 2651910, at *5 (Del. 
Com. Pl. June 23, 2011) (same).  
  109 Barnes, Objective Theory, supra note 17, at 1129. 
 110 Id. at 1131. 
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interests. 111 Regrettably, Radin mentions none of these salutary principles in her 
book.  
C. The Subjective Theory Compared 
The (former) competitor to the objective standard, the subjective theory of 
obligation, looks to actual, shared mental assent. This theory seeks to discover such 
intent “[e]ven at the expense of unambiguous language to the contrary.”112 Under the 
subjective construct, the parties’ external acts are merely necessary evidence to 
prove or disprove the requisite state of mind.113 Radin’s book contains no express 
reference to the subjective theory. 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the objective doctrine as a general theory 
of obligation has prevailed in the United States.114 Accordingly, it remains a truism 
that courts and commentators have “roundly rejected” the subjective theory of 
consent as an overarching principle.115 Thus, in ascertaining binding assent, courts 
have observed, “What is looked to in determining whether an agreement has been 
reached is not the parties' after-the-fact professed subjective intent, but their 
objective intent as manifested by their expressed words and deeds at the time.”116 A 
famous case also comments that the actual subjective intent of the parties “[c]an 
neither make [a] contract, nor prevent one, if [the] words used were sufficient to 
constitute [a] contract.”117 The courts are also careful to emphasize that they 
“[r]efuse to inquire into the subjective mental processes of each of the parties to a 
contract, except in the most compelling circumstances.”118 
                                                                                                                                         
 111 Id. at 1157; see also Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“[I]f intent were wholly subjective there would be no parol evidence rule, no contract 
case could be decided without a jury trial, and no one could know the effect of a commercial 
transaction until years after the documents were inked. That would be a devastating blow to 
business.”); Universal Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 589 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“The 
necessity of preserving predictability and stability in commercial transactions is fostered by 
this objective view of contracts.”).  
 112 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1166 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(citing Hershon v. Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 864 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  
 113 Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 114 Id.  
 115 Luden’s Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers’ Int’l 
Union of Am., 28 F.3d 347, 363 n.29 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Bennett v. Emerson Elec. Co., 
186 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (D. Kan. 2002) (“This subjective theory of contract formation has 
been rejected by contemporary contract experts and the Restatement.”) (citing authorities).  
 116 Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), modified 
on appeal, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam 
Constr. Corp., 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y. 1977)); see also Hancock Paper Co. v. Hancock 
Int’l Corp., 424 F. Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (examining a party’s subjective intent 
violates “basic contract law”).  
 117 Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1907); see also Newman, 778 F.2d at 465 (deeming Embry a “classic decision” illustrating the 
objective test).  
 118 Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. App. 1996). 
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Perhaps the major practical reason for the objective theory’s dominance and the 
decline of the subjective doctrine is that strict reliance on the subjective test and any 
effort to delve into the minds of the parties is futile insofar as “[c]ourts neither claim 
nor possess psychic power.”119 As Judge Frank Easterbrook said in his pithy way, 
“Yet [contract] ‘intent’ does not invite a tour through [a party’s] cranium, with [that 
party] as the guide.”120 Because the subjective approach relies on evidence directly 
inaccessible to the other party, much less to third parties, broad judicial 
consideration of subjective intent would undermine the security of transactions by 
greatly reducing the reliability of contractual commitments.121 Also, a party’s 
subjective mental assent is not generally needed as evidence in a contract dispute 
because contract law protects reasonable expectations.122  
While the subjective theory as a general doctrine of assent no longer prevails, 
vestiges have survived. The key exception permitting subjective evidence is where 
the contract is ambiguous, i.e., open to two or more reasonable interpretations.123 
One significant embellishment exists to this exception. Unless the second party 
knows or has reason to know of the particular meaning attached by the other party 
manifesting assent, the latter party’s subjective understanding is not controlling on 
the scope of the agreement.124  
Some courts attribute the move from the subjective doctrine to the objective 
doctrine as tracking the broader societal transition from the 19th-century’s emphasis 
on that century's philosophical individualism to the 20th century’s emphasis on the 
need for the greater security of contracts in a commercial economy.125 In any event, 
most notably where the contract is unambiguous, the subjective doctrine today has 
little more than historical importance.126 
D. Radin’s View of the Objective Theory 
Radin’s explanation of the objective theory of contract is brief. She defines it as 
where a person in the position of the offeror is entitled to understand that the person 
                                                                                                                                         
 119 Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980). 
“[T]he controversy has been resolved. Contract law abandoned the theory of subjective 
intention as unworkable.” JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 30, at 61-
64 (4th ed. 2001).  
 120 Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987).  
 121 Solan, supra note 104, at 367 (citing Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 273 (1986)).  
 122 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 209 (3d ed. 2004). 
 123 Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) PTE, Ltd. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 311, 321-22 
(2011) (citing decisions); see also Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 743 F. 
Supp. 2d 1235, 1255 (D.N.M. 2010) (“Where the contract language is ambiguous—i.e., 
subject to two or more reasonable interpretations—the court may consider things outside the 
text of the contract to determine its meaning.”).  
 124 Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 
1979).  
 125 Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 507 (Or. 1977). 
 126 Barnes, Objective Theory, supra note 17, at 1123; see also supra notes 120-21 and 
accompanying text.  
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in the position of the offeree has agreed to enter into a contract on the terms 
proposed if a reasonable person in the position of the offeror would have understood 
the offeree’s words and conduct as signaling agreement to the offeror’s terms.127 
While she says that the “meeting of the minds” terminology is no longer important, 
she also observes that if the reasonable person would have understood the other 
person’s words and actions in the context to accept the deal, the deal is in effect, “no 
matter what was actually inside the mind of the other.”128 
While Radin’s summary has some validity, she also calls the objective theory a 
“search for actual consent.”129 One of her major points is that the objective theory of 
contractual consent “does not make sense” for boilerplate contracts.130 Her reasoning 
is that consumers have not been “socialized into a common form of life” with the 
sellers of boilerplate such that the language is “mutually intelligible.”131 She further 
contends that the objective theory should control only for buyers and sellers who are 
in a “community of traders.”132 As will be shown below, Radin’s analysis contradicts 
established doctrine in various respects.  
The first area where Radin’s discussion is incomplete is her treatment of the 
“meeting of the minds.” Radin errs in two ways in her discussion of the quoted 
concept. First, she calls it “peripheral to standard contract doctrine” only used 
“sometimes.”133 In fact, the appellate decisions use this phrase practically every 
day.134 Second, she says courts use the concept from a “pocket of subjectivity”135 
when the truth is that numerous courts consider “meeting of the minds” as being 
consistent with the objective theory. As the Georgia Court of Appeals recently 
observed,  
In determining if parties had the mutual assent or meeting of the minds 
necessary to reach agreement, courts apply an objective theory of intent 
whereby one party's intention is deemed to be that meaning a reasonable 
[person] in the position of the other contracting party would ascribe to the 
first party's manifestations of assent.136  
                                                                                                                                         
 127 RADIN, supra note 3, at 86. 
 128 Id.; see also id. at 124.  
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 87. 
 131 Id. at 86-87. 
 132 Id. at 87. 
 133 Id. at 124. 
 134 A Westlaw search for October 2013 using the search field “allcases” revealed 49 
contract decisions referencing the phrase “meeting of the minds.” 
 135 RADIN, supra note 3, at 124. 
 136 Graham v. HHC St. Simons, Inc., 746 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); accord 
Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Labs., Inc., 972 F.2d 799, 802 (7th Cir.1992) (construing 
Illinois law); Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 810 S.W.2d 910, 915-16 (Ark. 1991); see also 
Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he fact 
that the service agreement is a boilerplate contract does not prevent a true meeting of the 
minds.”).  
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Radin’s erroneous reading of the cases about the supposedly subjective nature of 
“meeting of the minds” has led to her making incorrect comments about other basic 
principles of assent. First, she says that “the search for actual consent” occurs by 
“means of the objective theory.”137 True enough, the parties to most contracts give 
both actual and apparent assent and yet both processes need not be present.138 The 
pivotal point, however, is whether the parties have joined in the manifestation of 
objective mutual assent (which is not the same as actual subjective assent).139 
Second, Radin has a difficulty with the established common law doctrine that a 
binding contract can result when a party accepts offered benefits from the first party 
with knowledge of the terms of the offer and where the second party’s actions 
manifest binding acceptance.140 This doctrine is sound because both parties are 
signaling their agreement to the deal. While Radin denigrates this last variety of 
consent as “constructive,” “hypothetical,” or “fictional” acceptance, she overlooks 
the above well-settled nature of this type of manifested assent and how it falls 
comfortably within the objective doctrine.141  
Building on her position that courts enforce hypothetical or fictional acceptance, 
Radin travels an unusual path in challenging the courts’ treatment of assent under the 
objective doctrine. Radin indicates that she is mainly concerned with whether the 
objective theory of assent seriously disadvantages consumers and is less concerned 
with citing precedents.142 She builds an elaborate argument addressing some 
important topics but without any citation to case law or other legal sources on why 
the law on mutual assent needs to adopt her reforms and how her proposal passes 
muster under core legal doctrine.143  
In the analysis below, I address the following special topics that pertain to 
Radin’s criticisms: social understanding and the objective theory; when consumers 
click “I agree”—is this an ambiguous action?; her resurrection of the subjective 
theory; and mutual assent and party information asymmetry. 
1. Social Understanding and the Objective Test 
In seeking the logical basis for the objective test, Radin points to the “objective 
theory of language” and the notion that “meaning depends on social 
                                                                                                                                         
 137 RADIN, supra note 3, at 86, 124. 
 138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1981).  
 139 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 33 (2013) (“The question of whether a contract has been 
made must be determined from a consideration of the expressed or manifested intention of the 
parties.”); see also id. (“This mutual assent cannot be based on subjective intent, but must be 
founded on an objective manifestation of mutual assent to the essential terms of the 
promise.”).  
 140 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing authorities); 
Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002); Ragan v. AT & T Corp., 824 
N.E.2d 1183, 1188 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005).  
 141 Compare RADIN, supra note 3, at 30, 83, 84, 93, 97 (criticizing so-called “fictional,” 
“hypothetical,” or “constructive” consent). 
 142 Id. at 82-84, 96-97. 
 143 Id. at 85-90. 
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understanding.”144 Therefore, Radin contends that the objective theory of assent as it 
relates to the reasonable person should be “[i]nterpreted as one socialized into a 
particular form of life relevant under the circumstances.”145 In this way, she believes 
the objective theory “more readily applies” to a situation where there are mutual 
understandings among a community of traders, i.e., understandings pertaining to 
established trade usages.146 Radin specifically applies this “community of traders” 
argument to Internet sale contracts.147  
As a matter of precedent, Radin’s conclusion is not supported because courts 
commonly apply the objective standard to boilerplate.148 To the extent that Radin in 
applying the objective test relies on “socialization,” rather than the canons of 
contract interpretation, her argument is more suited to an intellectual realm other 
than the law of contracts.149 While Radin is clearly knowledgeable in the social 
sciences—which defines the quoted term as “a continuing process whereby an 
individual acquires a personal identity and learns the norms, values, behavior, and 
social skills appropriate to his or her social position”150—no cases were found 
considering this “socialization” theory in the context of contract interpretation. Radin 
nevertheless does raise a legal argument when she says the objective test makes 
sense only for traders in the same commercial community.151  
In point of fact, the precedents already account for her concerns. The general rule 
is that absent express or implied contract terms to the contrary, when parties form a 
contract that is governed by a general usage, the parties impliedly agree to be bound 
by the usage in question.152 In an important qualification, however, the law provides 
that an uninformed consumer generally will not be bound by trade usages where he 
                                                                                                                                         
 144 Id. at 86. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 86-87. A “trade usage” generally refers to a uniform course of conduct in some 
particular business or trade. 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:2 (4th ed. 
2012). An example of a trade usage is in the paper trade where “no. 1 heavy book paper 
guaranteed free from ground wood” means paper not containing over 3% ground wood. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222, illus. 6 (1981).  
 147 RADIN, supra note 3, at 87-88. 
 148 E.g., Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992) (applying objective 
standard to an insurance policy, which is a contract of adhesion); Amera-Seiki Corp. v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 721 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2013) (same); Mogil v. Cal. Physicians Corp., 
267 Cal. Rptr. 487, 493 (Cal. Dist Ct. App. 1990) (same).  
 149 Technically, Radin is advocating the use of concepts from the field of sociolinguistics, 
i.e., the study of language as it functions in society. As one commentator notes, however, 
courts thus far have not expressly adopted these sociological concepts for contract 
interpretation. See Jiri Janko, Note, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: 
Incorporating Semiotic Theory of Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 RUTGERS 
L.J. 601, 602 (2007). 
 150 Socialization Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
socialization. Compare RADIN, supra note 3, at 87 (using this term).  
 151 RADIN, supra note 3, at 87. 
 152 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:3 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing 
incorporation of trade usages into contracts; also including the U.C.C. approach). 
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is not a member of the particular community of traders.153 As stated by the California 
District Court of Appeals, “[t]he rule [deeming parties bound by trade usages] is not 
operative against one who is not a member of the trade or profession ‘unless he in 
fact knows it or has such reason to know it that the member reasonably believes that 
he knows it.”154 A substantial number of decisions also state that a court should 
accept evidence of trade practice only where a party makes a showing that it relied 
reasonably on a competing interpretation of the words when it entered into the 
contract.”155 Both principles have a limiting effect upon the stronger party’s ability 
to employ a trade usage against the weaker one.  
Based on the above sources, Radin’s concerns about the possible unfair impact of 
trade usages upon the consumer are misplaced. The reason is the law adequately 
protects the weaker party when he lacks actual knowledge or a reason to know of 
particular trade usages. 
2. When Consumers Click “I Agree”—An Ambiguous Action? 
In one of her main disputes with the objective theory, Radin questions whether a 
merchant would be justified in concluding that the consumer (recipient) who clicks 
the “I agree” button in an online computer contractual transaction is manifesting 
binding assent.156  
Although she says “clicking ‘I agree’ is not an idiosyncratic procedure,” she still 
contends that when the buyer clicks “I agree” in on-line computer sales contracts that 
the seller is not justified in concluding that the buyer is necessarily signaling his 
consent.157 Her reason is consumers “are almost certainly not thinking about or 
intending to consent [or able to understand] to terms that may deprive them of 
important legal rights . . .”158 Because the words in mass market boilerplate contracts 
are not “mutually intelligible” to sellers and consumers, and because the seller has 
reason to believe the user has engaged in “mindless clicking,” her argument (with no 
                                                                                                                                         
 153 Id. 
 154 Wooley v. Schilder, 327 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981) (“Unless otherwise agreed, a usage 
of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a usage of trade of which 
they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or supplements or qualifies their 
agreement.”). Compare 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:1 (4th ed. 
2012) (“ However, as is the case with the interpretive function of usage, before custom and 
usage can supplement or qualify an agreement, each party must ordinarily know or have 
reason to know of the usage. Furthermore, any term to be established as part of a contract by 
custom and usage of trade must not be inconsistent with other contract terms, must be well-
settled, and must be acted on uniformly.”).   
 155 Jowett, Inc. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Metric 
Constructors, Inc. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 169 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
Compare 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:5 (4th ed. 2012) (evidence of 
usage is admissible under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts to explain or interpret contractual terms and provisions even if the terms or 
provisions are not ambiguous).  
 156 RADIN, supra note 3, at 89. 
 157 Id. at 88.  
 158 Id. 
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supporting precedents) is “the objective theory of contract . . . is not applicable to 
boilerplate.”159  
Radin further posits that a “[r]easonable recipient in this culture would be likely 
to know (if she did think about it) that firms are in the habit of exploiting consumers 
with boilerplate terms and thereby depriving them of important legal background 
rights.”160 She also contends that the reasonable merchant would not conclude that 
the buyer has sufficiently assented under the objective test merely by clicking “I 
agree.”161  
In making her case, Radin implies that the law is incapable of dealing with online 
contracts but she does not account for the frequent judicial statement, “While new 
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not 
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”162 Even though there is case law 
she could have (but did not) cite to bolster her argument,163 the decisions generally 
have specifically approved assent in this on-line scenario. Again, because Radin’s 
normative argument has a strong doctrinal component, it is incumbent for her to 
convince the reader how her argument satisfies core legal doctrines. Radin should 
also have disclosed the contrary legal authority and attempted to distinguish or reject 
the courts’ reasoning, but she did not do so.  
The general reason the consumer’s clicking “I agree” suffices to form a binding 
agreement is because the consumer’s informing the merchant “I agree” is the 
consumer’s unambiguous, voluntary and affirmative act of assent that equates to a 
signature. It should not be required for the consumer to make an online statement to 
the effect that “I consent—and I really mean it.” As one commentator observes, 
“Many courts . . . have found the act of clicking an ‘I agree’ button to be an express 
manifestation of assent to contract terms. Some opinions have said so explicitly, 
while others seem to assume without discussion that when an offeree is required to 
click an ‘I agree’ button, she knows that she is entering into a contract.”164 In 
essence, courts rule that binding the consumer to his voluntary external 
manifestation of assent satisfies the core principle of the objective test. 
Nevertheless, Radin insists that the meaning of clicking “I agree” is “something 
that can have different meanings.”165 From a legal standpoint, Radin’s 
characterization of the effect of clicking “I agree” is unpersuasive. When the 
consumer tenders this “explicit acceptance” of a license agreement, numerous courts 
properly indicate that this conduct raises no contestable issues of fact upon a motion 
                                                                                                                                         
 159 Id. at 86-89. 
 160 Id. at 88. 
 161 Id. at 88-89. 
 162 E.g., One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 
2011); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004); Bob Montgomery 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 193 n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013). 
 163 See Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(analyzed in notes 251-53 infra and accompanying text). 
 164 Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1307, 1323-24 (2005). For a discussion of “clickwrap,” see supra Part IV.D.  
 165 RADIN, supra note 3, at 90. 
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for summary judgment.166 The exception is that a consumer's (offeree) clicking the “I 
agree” button does not manifest assent to contractual terms in the rare circumstance 
where the seller’s offer did not inform the consumer that this action would signify 
assent to the terms. Accordingly, the consumer will be bound only if the license 
terms were reasonably conspicuous to an average user167 but it should be emphasized 
that “Most e-businesses, however, currently carefully signal the significance of 
clicking ‘I agree.’”168  
Statutes also support that the on-line consumer in this way manifests his assent. 
By law in several jurisdictions, a party that clicks “I agree” necessarily assents to the 
license and adopts its terms under the Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
Act (UCITA).169 Based on this established case and statutory law for these 
jurisdictions, Radin’s argument is without merit that a consumer’s clicking the “I 
agree” button in a computer transaction is inherently ambiguous to the merchant who 
characteristically carefully advises the consumer of the consequences of this action.  
In contrast with Radin, Randy Barnett has offered a powerful legal argument on 
why the consumer’s clicking “I agree” satisfies the manifested assent element under 
the objective theory and the plain meaning rule170: 
When one clicks “I agree” to the terms on the box, does one usually know 
what one is doing? Absolutely. There is no doubt whatsoever that one is 
objectively manifesting one's assent to the terms in the box, whether or 
not one has read them. The same observation applies to signatures on 
form contracts. Clicking the button that says “I agree,” no less than 
signing one's name on the dotted line, indicates unambiguously: I agree to 
be legally bound by the terms in this agreement. 
 
If consent to be legally bound is the basis of contractual enforcement, 
rather than the making of a promise, then consent to be legally bound 
seems to exist objectively. Even under the modern objective theory, there 
                                                                                                                                         
 166 See I.Lan Sys. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 
2002); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Kraft Real 
Estate Invests., LLC v. HomeAway.com, Inc., No. 4:08-CV-3788, 2012 WL 220271, at *7-8 
(D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2012); DeJohn v. The TV Corp. Int’l., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
Compare Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (“Because the 
user has ‘signed’ the contract by clicking ‘I agree,’ every court to consider the issue has held 
clickwrap licenses enforceable. There is nothing inherently troubling about enforcing 
clickwrap licenses.” (emphasis added)). 
 167 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-32 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying 
objective theory; excusing consumer from using a scroll bar to ascertain whether contract 
terms existed below the web site’s “fold”).  
 168 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 88, at 481. 
 169 UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) § 112, cmt. 5, illus. 1 (1999). A 
model act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and originally submitted as draft Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code, UCITA is a 
comprehensive contracts code for computer information transactions that has been enacted in 
Virginia and Maryland. See MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW §§ 22-101 et seq.; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
59.1-501.1 et seq.; see also 15B AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 107 (2013). 
 170 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002). 
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is no reason for the other party to believe that such subjective consent is 
lacking. Even if one does not want to be bound, one knows that the other 
party will take this conduct as indicating consent to be bound thereby.171 
While Radin mentions Barnett’s approach on consent to Internet contracts, and 
concedes that American judges “often” agree with it, she does not offer an effective 
rebuttal. Her legal argument is that those persons who espouse the Barnett position 
do so by using the “trope” (rhetorical device) of “reasonable expectation.”172 What 
she leaves out is any case in the Internet contract context that has used this trope to 
impose a finding of assent173 and Barnett does not use this device. Otherwise, Radin 
is content merely to criticize the Barnett position largely by arguing that 
“[i]nformation and prevalent heuristic biases undercut any simple interpretation of 
the behaviors of signing or clicking.”174 Because “heuristic bias”—the construct 
from psychology that persons irrationally underestimate the frequency of adverse 
outcomes, such as illness or accidents (or from boilerplate)—by itself is not a 
defense to contract enforcement, this argument is unpersuasive. 
Radin further believes that the objective theory of contract “does not help” in the 
effort to construe the effect of where the recipient clicks “I agree.” Her reason is that 
the objective theory of consent does not relate to the reasonable understanding of the 
recipient.175 Instead, she claims the objective theory pertains only to the reasonable 
understanding of the merchant who Radin believes could not reasonably conclude 
that the purchaser was manifesting assent.176 My response from the case law is that 
the better vantage point on the objective theory takes into account the perspective of 
both parties.177 Accordingly, no serious doubt can exist in all jurisdictions, given the 
                                                                                                                                         
 171 Id. at 635.  
 172 RADIN, supra note 3, at 163. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id.; see also id. at 103 (explaining “heuristic bias”). 
 175 Id. at 89. 
 176 Id. 
 177 The more persuasive cases construe reasonable understanding from the vantage point of 
both parties. See, e.g., DLY-Adams Place, LLC v. Waste Mgmt. of Md., Inc., 2 A.3d 163, 166 
(D.C. 2010); Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 
1196 (Del. 1992); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (Md. 
1985); see also Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Mich. 1993) (“To 
determine whether there was mutual assent to a contract, ‘we use an objective test, “looking to 
the expressed words of the parties and their visible acts.”’”). As Larry DiMatteo points out, 
“[t]he reasonable person is a product of the creative efforts of the promisor and promisee. As 
such, neither party’s perspective alone can adequately serve the interpretive mandate of the 
reasonable person.” Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable 
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 334 (1997). Further, 
the single party-only perspective is inconsistent with the very nature of contract which, as 
Arthur Allen Leff observed many years ago, “is the product of a joint creative effort.” Arthur 
Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 138 (1970). Indeed, the single party 
theory contradicts the courts’ essential “role” in contract construction, which is to “effectuate 
the intent of the parties.” E.g., Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 844 (6th Cir. 
2013); Koch Indus., Inc. v. Sun Co., 918 F.2d 1203, 1208 (5th Cir.1990); Frost Nat'l Bank v. 
L & F Distribs., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311 (Tex. 2005) (emphasis added).  
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care that goes into the creation of today’s software, that clicking “I agree” to readily 
discoverable terms is generally an unambiguous assertion of consent.178  
3. Radin’s Resurrection of the Subjective Theory 
In more subtle ways, Radin in her critique of the objective theory and in her zeal 
to protect consumers (with little, if any, mention of legitimate vendor interests) has 
suggested a strategy damaging to general contract doctrine and, ultimately, to the 
consumer as well.  
On the one hand, Radin correctly states that mutual assent can be present “no 
matter what was actually inside the mind of the other.”179 If she had stopped there, 
no issues would be present. Overlooking the common law checks and balances on 
the objective doctrine, however, Radin necessarily has embraced the discredited 
subjective standard of obligation. The proof for this assertion is that her book 
contains numerous arguments based on the consumer’s “real consent,” “actual 
consent,” “actual agreement,” or “actual assent.”180 Courts and commentators agree 
that these terms relate only to the offeror’s personal state of mind and his subjective 
understandings.181 Radin even concedes that she endorses a theory of assent 
dependent upon the party’s “free will” and a “subjective basis (or better a basis 
internal to personhood.)”182 Again, Radin in effect has bypassed the objective theory 
of assent. 
Perhaps her clearest endorsement of this incorrect subjective standard is her 
comment above that “consent depends on the processes internal to a person” 183 even 
though the law consistently says to the contrary that actual mental impressions of a 
party without more are not the source of contractual obligation.184 In this regard, 
while Radin at one point correctly observes that the objective theory “does not 
                                                                                                                                         
 178 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.  
 179 RADIN, supra note 3, at 86. 
 180 Id. at 20, 31, 72, 75, 77, 81, 84, 86, 89, 90, 93, 96, 102. 
 181 Compare Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The subjectivists 
looked to actual assent.”); Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 
634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“It must be emphasized that the assent analysis is not 
premised upon the actual assent of the parties.”); Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Labs., 972 
F.2d 799, 802 (7th Cir.1992) (“[W]hether [the parties] had a ‘meeting of the minds’ . . . is 
determined by reference to what the parties expressed to each other in their writings, not by 
their actual mental processes.”); Farmington Police Officers Ass’n Local 7911 v. City of 
Farmington, 137 P.3d 1204, 1211 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (“Application of an objective 
standard does not require inquiry into the actual understandings of the parties.”); see also 1 E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208 (3d ed. 2004) (actual assent 
on the part of both parties “was necessary” under the subjective view); Barnes, Objective 
Theory, supra note 17, at 1123 (subjective theory focuses upon “actual assent”); Nancy S. 
Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 808 n.36 (2008) (a proposal that Internet 
contracting should require actual consent is “contrary to current contract law”). 
 182 RADIN, supra note 3, at 89. 
 183 Id. at 23.  
 184 See 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:5 (4th ed. 2012) (extensive 
discussion of rule). 
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require subjective understanding,”185 the remainder of her argument still insists that 
actual consent is needed. Also, Radin fails to mention that “[i]t is the manifestation 
of mutual assent, and not its genuineness, that is essential.”186  
As Judge Learned Hand stated in a 1917 opinion that continues to resonate with 
current-day courts: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the 
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which 
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were 
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, 
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes 
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, 
or something else of the sort.187 
By stating the contract is dependent upon the parties’ actual intent, Radin ignores 
foundational elements of mutual assent. 
What then is the formal version of Radin’s theory for mutual assent? Without 
citation to authority, Radin insists that “autonomy theory” (subjective free will and 
intent) remains the “primary theory” for justifying “the institution of contract.”188 
The Reporter to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however, states that this 
same “subjective” will theory from the 1800s has been “displaced.”189 As another 
commentator observes: 
The will theory of contract--and its logical corollary, a subjective 
approach to contract formation--never found much traction with the courts 
in the United States, and it fizzled as a contract theory largely because it 
was inconsistent with the objective theory of contract formation, which 
was needed in “an increasingly national corporate economy . . . .190  
                                                                                                                                         
 185 RADIN, supra note 3, at 89-90. 
 186 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:4 (4th ed. 2012); see also id. (“If it 
were true that subjective mental assent were the vital matter, it would follow that, absent 
reasonable detrimental reliance on the outward manifestation, there would be no obligation. . . 
. There is little if any support for such a doctrine . . . .”). 
 187 Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 201 F. 664 (2d 
Cir. 1912), aff’d, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). For examples of modern cases citing Hotchkiss with 
approval, see Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 696, 706 (2007); Zheng 
v. City of New York, 973 N.E.2d 711, 716 (N.Y. 2012); Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 
A.2d 181, 190 n.6 (D.C. App. 2009). 
 188 RADIN, supra note 3 at 90. 
 189 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 Reporter’s Note, cmt c. (1981).  
 190 Daniel P. O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About Employee Covenant 
Not to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 165 (2012); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, 
“Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943 (1967) (subjective theory was 
conjoined with the “will” theory of contracts in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the 
Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 55 n.205 (1996) (will theory is 
the “purest form” of party autonomy theory). 
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From a practical perspective, Radin’s advocacy for the incorrect standard for 
consent would imperil the ultimate validity of the great majority of consumer 
contracts. All mass market contracts with vendors of credit cards, cell phones, and 
new automobiles, among numerous other items, could be in jeopardy in litigation if 
the consumer simply has a change of heart. Radin’s theory makes the contract’s 
enforcement hang upon the consumer’s post hoc description of his true intent, which 
could increase the temptation for dissembling testimony and even perjury. One must 
recall that this potential danger is exacerbated by the fact ninety nine percent of all 
contracts are standard form mass market consumer contracts. 191  
Radin’s argument further leads to a legal principle that I doubt she would endorse 
if asked. Again, the issue here is that if the law required evidence of a party’s actual 
state of mind, a contract could be deemed unenforceable in litigation where a party 
later testifies he did not give his actual consent.192 If subjective intent were the 
standard for mutual assent, then both sides can claim the same rights and remedies in 
the contract on this issue. Radin further appears to overlook that if there is no 
contract, the consumer lacks the legal predicate for bringing an action for breach of 
contract. Merchants would have the same incentive to dissembling testimony and 
even perjury. While giving the merchant the same ability as the consumer to 
disclaim its actual intent is fair to both parties, and meets the rule that courts favor 
neither party in contract construction,193 such a development giving the merchant a 
significant potential escape hatch from the deal is certainly an unintended 
consequence of Radin’s proposed standard.  
4. Mutual Assent and Information Asymmetry 
In the final issue on Radin’s view of the objective doctrine, she believes that 
mutual consent and “free choice” is lacking with significant information asymmetry 
between the two sides.194 The law has no difficulty, however, that one party may 
have a significant and even commanding information advantage regarding the 
subject matter, with an exception for one side’s fraud or where the discrepancy is so 
extreme that the law creates a fiduciary relationship (most commonly seen with the 
sale of professional services).195 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has ruled that  
[P]arties to a contract often have unequal information going in, and 
ordinarily a party with superior information is entitled to exploit it in 
negotiations. Otherwise businessmen's incentives to obtain commercially 
valuable information, and by doing so speed the adjustment of prices to 
new conditions of supply and demand, would be impaired.196  
                                                                                                                                         
 191 Barnes, Objective Theory, supra note 17, at 1148. 
 192 See supra note 103 and accompanying text; Barnes, Objective Theory, supra note 17, at 
1127 (similar point). 
 193 See Rainey v. Stansell 836 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).  
 194 RADIN, supra note 3, at 24-26 (noting how consumers have less training and ability than 
merchants to understand technical terms); id. at 102-03. 
 195 Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Lei Wang, 651 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 196 Id. (also noting without objection that “[t]here is often an extreme asymmetry of 
information between seller and buyer when the seller is the provider of a professional 
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Radin’s comment also has no support on policy grounds. Radin overlooks that, 
even with a major informational discrepancy between buyer and seller, there is 
patent unfairness (absent that party’s fraud and the like) in precluding parties from 
using their fairly earned skills and knowledge in a market economy. I would add that 
allowing each party to take advantage of its lawful talent, insight, or expertise is the 
hallmark of freedom of contract.197 For all the doctrinal and practical considerations 
discussed above, Radin’s misplaced requirement for actual subjective consent 
seriously detracts from her argument that contract doctrine has suffered normative 
degradation.  
IV. ARE ADHESION CONTRACTS “PURPORTED CONTRACTS?” 
As compared with Part III, this section analyzes and resolves the related topic of 
what Radin terms the “purported contract” nature of adhesion contracts.198 A 
separate analysis is needed in Part IV because adhesion contracts, unlike boilerplate 
and standard form agreements, will likely raise the most significant potential issues 
of mutual assent.199 The unifying theme for both sections, however, is that even 
accepting Radin’s attempt to engraft the Worlds A and B construct upon the law of 
contracts, the objective theory of mutual assent is versatile enough to bind parties to 
the instruments in both World A and World B.  
One of Radin’s major themes is her repeated argument that mass-market 
boilerplate agreements are only “purported contracts” because they are not bargains 
that reflect the buyer’s knowing and voluntary consent. 200 Based on this alleged 
aspect of mass market boilerplate contracts, her contention is courts have improperly 
watered down mutual assent.201 Therefore, for Radin, “a purported contract 
                                                                                                                                         
service.”); see also PXRE Reinsurance Co. v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 342 F. Supp. 2d 
752, 762 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“Transactions almost always begin with asymmetry of information, 
but that does not eliminate the need for the less-informed party to exercise ordinary 
prudence.”). 
 197 See 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4, at 393 (rev. ed. 2002) 
(freedom of contract necessarily recognizes that parties can properly employ superior 
analytical, tactical, and other resources as compared with others).  
 198 See infra Part IV.E.  
 199 See supra Part II.B. 
 200 RADIN, supra note 3, at 30-31, 83, 84, 93. Radin uses the term “purported contract” 
fifteen times and emphasizes that this description applies in her book even when not 
specifically called out. Id. at 10.  
 201 Radin sees a difference between agreement and the notions of consent or assent. Radin 
contends that agreement is a bilateral exchange whereas consent and assent are more of a one-
sided process where one party proposes and the other side “says OK.” Id. at 83. In point of 
fact, the concepts are closely linked because an “agreement” is a “manifestation of mutual 
assent by two or more persons.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981); see also 
Weddington Prod., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 277 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (creation 
of a valid contract requires “mutual consent”). 
Radin also argues that consent and assent are different concepts in the law of contracts 
whereby “assent” is more passive than “consent.” Radin further states that assent may require 
less information than consent regarding whether the assent is valid. Radin, supra note 3, at 83. 
To the contrary, as stated by the Mississippi Court of Appeals, the two quoted concepts are 
“interchangeable.” Hugh Dancy Co., Inc. v. Mooneyham, 68 So. 3d 76, 80 (Miss. Ct. App. 
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containing offending boilerplate should be declared “invalid in toto” which 
necessarily means she believes these contracts are void ab initio. 202  
On the other hand, she backs away from this broad voidness argument as she 
clarifies in a footnote that she actually opposes making all adhesion contracts prima 
facie unenforceable because that result would be “overkill.”203 Her rationale for the 
revised statement is that her “concern” is not just with contracts lacking dickered 
terms but with “some adhesion contracts” creating normative degradation, especially 
those contracts that are “mass market rights deletion schemes.”204 
As stated above,205 Radin has created confusion in her discussion of the 
relationship between adhesion contracts, standardized contracts and boilerplate. I 
have also shown that she wavers on whether offending boilerplate contracts are 
always or sometimes void ab initio. Because in at least one place Radin deems 
boilerplate to be a subset of adhesion contracts, and because she equates boilerplate 
and adhesion contracts in several others, my critique on whether World B contracts 
are purported contracts will center on adhesion contracts (which I contend is the 
legal system’s real concern with mass market standard form contracts). I also believe 
this topic is also Radin’s implicit preferred area for analysis. She states that her 
“focus” is on “adhesion contracts” that are mass market boilerplate rights deletion 
schemes.206  
As explained below, the decisions are split on the nature and validity of 
consumer assent in mass market contracts of adhesion. Diligent research has not 
shown that another commentator has identified (or resolved) this division in the 
cases. 
                                                                                                                                         
2011). Both terms mean “agreement, approval, or permission.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
346, 132 (9th ed. 2009).  
 202 RADIN, supra note 3, at 213; see also In re Cross, 290 B.R. 157, 160 (Bankr. D. Nev. 
2001); State ex rel. Ne. Transp. Co. v. Superior Court of King Cnty., 77 P.2d 1012, 1020 
(Wash. 1938) (cases equating void ab initio and invalid in toto). Actually, the decisions 
indicate that a contract lacking mutual assent is voidable at the option of the party that did not 
give binding assent. See 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:4 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 203 RADIN, supra note 3, at 302. Radin wisely recedes from her initial conclusion that 
offending adhesion contracts are void. The voiding of a contract can be a harsh remedy, 
United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566 (1961), and as a species of 
forfeiture, this sanction must be strictly construed, cf. DeVito v. United States, 413 F.2d 1147, 
1153 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (remedy of default termination). The cases have repeatedly recognized 
that voiding a contract is a drastic and extraordinary remedy that should be reserved only for 
those cases plainly calling for its application. E.g., Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473, 
1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1993); John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964) (illegality must be plain and palpable to void a 
contract). 
 204 RADIN, supra note 3, at 302 n.42. 
 205 See supra Part II. 
 206 RADIN, supra note 3, at 33; see also supra note 34 (noting that Radin teaches a course 
on boilerpate at the Michigan Law School making “adhesion contracts” her focus for 
analysis). 
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A. Adhesion Contracts and Mutual Assent—The Competing Lines of Authority  
The possibility of merchants overreaching with adhesion contracts ups the ante 
for courts ascertaining the existence of mutual assent for these instruments.207 
Therefore, the important question is whether the objective theory (and cognate 
principles) can support mutual assent for an adhesion contract. The proper resolution 
of this issue is subject to the general task of the law which is, wherever possible, to 
deem a contract enforceable rather than unenforceable.208     
1. Cases Upholding Mutual Assent 
One line of authority would definitely reject the Radin “purported contract” 
theory as applied to adhesion contracts. These decisions state that “contracts of 
adhesion are well accepted in the law and routinely enforced.”209 Numerous cases 
further hold that the objective, plain meaning of the unambiguous words in the 
contract rather than the parties’ subjective intent or understandings supply the 
requisite consent that will govern an adhesion contract210 (typically but not always 
insurance policies).211  
                                                                                                                                         
 207 See supra Part II. 
 208 See Schnall v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 129, 131 (Wash. 2011) (“We 
interpret contract provisions to render them enforceable wherever possible.”); Homes of 
Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 746 (Ala. 2000) (“[W]here there is a choice 
between a valid construction and an invalid construction the court has a duty to accept the 
construction that will uphold, rather than destroy, the contract and that will give effect and 
meaning to all of its terms.”); 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:11 (4th 
ed. 2012) (“interpretations which render the contract fair and reasonable are preferred to those 
which render the contract harsh or unreasonable to one party”).  
 209 Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 355 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), 
cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1067 (2008). 
 210 See Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
330, 337 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App 2011); Maloney-Refaie v. Bridge at Sch., Inc., 958 A.2d 871, 879 
(Del. Ch. 2008); Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So.3d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2010); see also Craft Mach. Works, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1110, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“In contract interpretation, the plain and unambiguous meaning of a written agreement 
controls.”). 
See also Graham v. Scissor-DTail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981) (describing a contract 
as adhesive “[i]s not to indicate its enforceability” because this description “[i]s the beginning 
and not the end of the analysis”); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 
1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (“[A] contract of adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms 
unless certain other factors are present which, under established legal rules-legislative or 
judicial-operate to render it otherwise.” (citations omitted)); Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 
N.W.2d 23, 30 (Mich. 2005) (an unambiguous contractual provision is reflective of the parties' 
intent as a matter of law). 
 211 E.g., Hamrick v. Aqua Glass, Inc., No. 07-3089-CL, 2008 WL 2853992, at *1 (D. Or. 
Feb. 20, 2008); Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 337; Maloney-
Refaie, 958 A.2d at 879; Harrington, 54 So.3d at 1002; see also Gianetti v. Riether, No. 
CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011); Energy Home 
v. Peay, 406 S.W.3d 828, 834 (Ky. 2013); Riehl v. Cambridge Court GF, LLC, 226 P.3d 581, 
584 (Mont. 2010) (cases ruling that adhesion contracts can meet the requirement for offer and 
acceptance). For other cases expressly applying the plain meaning rule to support the 
objective theory of mutual assent, see, for example, Stamas v. Cnty. of Madera, 795 F. Supp. 
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The above “plain meaning” rule provides that “[i]f a writing, or a provision in a 
writing, appears to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined 
from the writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence.”212 This theory of 
assent generally holds that if the writing conveys an unmistakable meaning, the four 
corners of the writing itself is the “sole source” for gaining an understanding of 
intent.213 The plain meaning rule applies equally to the existence of mutual assent 
and the validity of a particular contract interpretation.214  
Other cases explicitly draw the connection between the “plain meaning” rule and 
the “objective theory.”215 Noted commentators do so as well. Thus, in commenting 
that “[I]t remains the case that a completely objective approach to promise would 
also vindicate form contracts,” Randy Barnett correctly concludes that the text-
driven version of the objective theory fully explains mutual assent for adhesion 
contracts.216 Most importantly for purposes of this discussion, case law reaches the 
same conclusion.217  
                                                                                                                                         
2d 1047, 1081, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 709-10 (Md. 
2007). 
 212 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (9th ed. 2009); see also BLGH Holdings LLC v. 
enXco LFG Holding, LLC, 41 A.3d 410, 414 (Del. 2012); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 24.7, at 33 (rev. ed. 1998) (“Courts that subscribe to the ‘plain meaning rule’ 
hold that if a ‘clear, unambiguous’ meaning is discernible in the language of the contract, no 
extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances may be admitted to challenge this 
interpretation.”). 
 213 City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del. 
1993) (stating rule) (emphasis added); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 
1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Absent illegality, unconscionableness, fraud, duress, or mistake 
the parties are bound by the terms of their contract.”); Coast Fed. Bank v. United States, 323 
F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (When “the provisions of the Agreement are 
phrased in clear and unambiguous language, they must be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning, and we may not resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret them.”); see also City of 
Golden v. Simpson, 83 P.3d 87, 93 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (“To ascertain [contracting] intent, 
the courts turn to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. If the terms are clear, a court 
will neither look outside the four corners of the instrument, nor admit extrinsic evidence to aid 
in interpretation.”). This four corners rule of interpretation of unambiguous contracts applies 
to insurance policies, JNJ Logistics, L.L.C. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 2:10-cv-02741-JPM-
cgc, 2013 WL 6903937, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 31, 2013), the most well-known example of 
an adhesion contract. See infra note 375.  
 214 See, e.g., Independence Twp. v. Reliance Bldg. Co., 437 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (“No contract can arise except on the express mutual assent of the parties. . . . We are 
bound to construe an unambiguous agreement according to its plain meaning.”). 
 215 Cnty. Comm'rs of Charles Cnty. v. Panda-Brandywine, L.P., 663 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 
(D. Md. 2009) (citing Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing, Co., 952 A.2d 275, 283 
(Md. 2008)).  
 216 See Barnett, supra note 171, at 630 n.10. For further discussion of the policy for the 
objective theory, see supra Part III.B. See also Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to 
Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 
2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 479-80 (2012) (extensive analysis for why the objective theory 
supports enforcement of adhesion contracts). Dissenting Justices Marshall and Stevens in 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Marshall J., Stevens, J., 
dissenting), were unimpressed with the views of some academic writers that adhesion 
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The rationale for the plain meaning rule—which is a corollary of the objective 
theory of contractual assent218—is that courts should honor the freedom of private 
contracts and not redo the parties’ bargain where the parties have lawfully expressed 
their intent by clear and unambiguous language.219 The plain meaning rule also 
derives from the conclusive presumption followed by some courts that absent 
mistake, fraud, and the like, parties understand their contractual obligations and have 
imputed knowledge of the reasonable meaning of their words and actions. 220 The 
plain meaning doctrine in some form is the majority rule in the United States.221 
The objective theory and its emphasis on the four corners of the document222 give 
rise to another principle of construction supportive of mutual assent for adhesion 
contracts. Absent an invalidating cause, such as the other party’s fraud, a party has a 
broad duty “to read its contract and to learn its contents before signing it.”223 This 
“duty to read” is a “basic tenet of contract law”224 and is closely aligned with the 
plain meaning rule.225 The main consequence will be that absent the other side’s 
                                                                                                                                         
contracts are not enforceable under traditional contract theory. Rejecting what they called this 
“extreme” position, the two justices concluded that that standardized form contracts account 
for a significant portion of all commercial agreements and also reflect legally sufficient assent. 
 217 E.g., Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So.3d 999, 1002 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010) 
(objective theory applies to insurance policies); 100 Inv. v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 60 
A.3d 1, 22 (Md. 2013) (same); see also Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 441 (Tenn. 
2012) (“Insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as contracts 
generally.”). 
 218 See Cnty Comm’rs of Charles Cnty v. Panda-Brandywine, 663 F. Supp. 2d 424 428 (D. 
Md. 2009) (citing Nova Research, Inc. v. Penske Truck Leasing, Co., 952 A.2d 275, 283 (Md. 
2008)) (under the objective theory of contract interpretation an unambiguous contract must be 
given the effect of its plain meaning in context and without regard to the parties' subjective 
intent at the time of formation). 
 219 See Prestige Valet, Inc. v. Mendel, 14 So. 3d 282, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Betz 
v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 825 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). 
 220 Tattoo Arts, Inc. v. Tat Int’l, LLC, No. 2:10CV323, 2011 WL 1304910, at *7 (E.D. Va. 
Feb. 28, 2011); Sutton v. First Nat’l Bank of Crossville, 620 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1981); Dunn v. United Sierra Corp., 612 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); McQuiddy 
Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 134 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939). In contract interpretation, 
“[a]bsent fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or ambiguity, the parties' intent will be determined 
from the plain meaning of the language used in the contract.” Close v. Fisette, 776 A.2d 131, 
134 (N.H. 2001). 
 221 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.12 at 308 (3d ed. 2004) 
(“[T]he overwhelming majority of courts retains some kind of plain meaning rule.”). 
 222 See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 223 Burwell v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 340 S.E.2d 786, 789 (S.C.1986); see also Roberts v. 
Roberts, 618 S.E.2d 761, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“Absent fraud or oppression, ‘parties to a 
contract have an affirmative duty to read and understand a written contract before signing 
it.’”). 
 224 Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 495 (Mont. 2009).  
 225 See In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., Inc., Nos. 02-10429(JFK) & 02-6531(JFK), 2004 
WL 97658, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 16, 2004) (linking concepts). 
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fraud, misrepresentation or similar defense, a party to a contract is legally bound by 
its terms whether he or she has actually read or understood them.226 In Pietroske, Inc. 
v. Globalcom, Inc.,227 the court commented: 
Failure to read a contract, particularly in a commercial contract setting, is 
not an excuse that relieves a person from the obligations of the contract. 
“Men, in their dealings with each other, cannot close their eyes to the 
means of knowledge equally accessible to themselves and those with 
whom they deal, and then ask courts to relieve them from the 
consequences of their lack of vigilance.”228 
Notably, the Pietroske court also ruled that “the fact that the service agreement is 
a boilerplate contract does not prevent a true meeting of the minds.”229  
The duty to read and understand a contract rests on sound economic and policy 
principles. Depending on the jurisdiction, one or more rationales supply the basis for 
the duty. Thus, courts have noted that the ignorant party is estopped from raising the 
defense of the lack of consent to unread terms; the party is bound by a conclusive 
presumption of knowledge; the uninformed signatory is held to the terms because he 
was negligent or assumed the risk; and a contrary rule would destroy the value of all 
written contracts.230 A Texas court opined that a person has an obligation to protect 
his or her own interests.231Additional legal principles support the duty to read. For 
example, a New Mexico case reasoned that, absent fraud or similar invalidating 
clause, the contract signatory “owes it to the other party to read or have read, the 
contract . . . because the other party has a right to and does conform his own conduct 
to the requirements of the contract . . .”232 Another supporting principle would be 
that the duty to read and understand the terms preserves fairness to merchants 
                                                                                                                                         
 226 See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 193 (2012); see also Uhar & Co. v. Jacob, 840 F. Supp. 2d 
287, 292 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 227 Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). 
 228 Id. (quoting Nauga, Inc. v. Westel Milwaukee Co., 576 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 229 Id. at 888; cf. Sherman v. Lunsford, 723 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“Although the parties may not have fully understood the legal significance of each and every 
term, they knew they were signing a binding contract.”). 
 230 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(assumption of the risk); Giles v. Allstate Ins. Co., 871 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1993) (estoppel, conclusive presumption, and negligence theories); Busching v. Griffin, 542 
So.2d 860, 865 (Miss.1989) (quoting Alliance Trust Co., Ltd. v. Armstrong, 186 So. 633, 635 
(Miss. 1939)) (contrary rule would “absolutely destroy the value of all contracts”); Moody 
Realty Co., Inc. v. Huestis, 237 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“Otherwise, written 
contracts would be worthless.” Also noting an exception where a person is a victim of trick or 
artifice by the party seeking to enforce the contract.). 
 231 Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962) (“parties to a contract have an 
obligation to protect themselves by reading what they sign”). 
 232 Morstad v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 170 P. 886, 889 (N.M. 1918). 
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because the law should preclude the consumer from accepting the benefits under the 
contract while selectively denying the existence of disliked provisions.233  
Furthermore, some courts say the law must permit the other party to trust the first 
party’s manifested assent as demonstrated by the first party's signature (or other 
approving action) so that parties in general can rely on the predictability and 
enforceability of contracts.234 All told, the duty to read and understand properly 
shifts the risk of misunderstanding the contract from the merchant as the drafter to 
the consumer where the latter fails to take proper measures to protect his own 
interests—which includes the need for a party (even an illiterate person) to seek 
assistance if he does not understand the contract terms.235  
As indicated above, the duty to read a contract is closely associated with the plain 
meaning rule. A sensible plain meaning rule is superior to a more liberal view giving 
weight to the circumstances extrinsic to the contract terms.236 As one commentator 
argues, “By letting in all extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties, the context 
rule unmoors the courts from shared and public standards of meaning and thereby 
invites gamesmanship and creates uncertainty.”237 When courts go beyond the parol 
evidence rule238 and freely allow the examination of extrinsic evidence to the 
contract, courts undermine “[t]he parties' ability to firmly and effectively set their 
agreement into writing in a manner that would be predictably enforced by the 
court.”239  
The plain meaning rule simplifies contract litigation and protects a party “against 
being blindsided by evidence,” possibly self-serving, intended to undermine the deal 
that the party thought it “had graven in stone by using clear language.”240 Failing to 
                                                                                                                                         
 233 See Colony Ins. Co. v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1059 CSH, 2012 WL 
2859085, at *10 (D. Conn. July 11, 2012) (consumer may not pick and choose the contract 
terms he wishes would be enforced); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
565 A.2d 908, 911 (Del. 1989) (“adhesive nature of a contract does not allow the non-drafting 
party to reject contract terms that he later finds unappealing”). 
 234 Colony, 2012 WL 2859085, at *10; Miner v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 
1093, 1102-03 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (linking duty to read and need for commercial stability); 
see 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 193 (2012) (same; also stating duty to read “[r]emove[s] the 
temptation and possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol evidence were 
admissible to vary the terms of such instrument”). 
 235 Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Frumin, 739 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (E.D. Wis. 1990); Clay v. First Family 
Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 4:02CV169-P-B, 2006 WL 2404682, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 2006) 
(“If one cannot understand [the contract], he or she must seek assistance in understanding it by 
a third party.” Also extending rule to an illiterate person.). 
 236 See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.  
 237 Goldstein, supra note 102, at 96. 
 238 “As a general rule, parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict, vary, or alter a written 
contract when the written instrument is valid, complete, and unambiguous, absent fraud or 
mistake or any claim or allegation thereof.” Harry J. Whelchel Co., Inc. v. Ripley Tractor Co., 
Inc., 900 S.W.2d 691, 692-93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 239 Goldstein, supra note 102, at 98. 
 240 Beanstalk Grp, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002); Air Line 
Pilots Ass'n Int’l v. Midwest Exp. Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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deal in any substantive way with the duty to read doctrine or the plain meaning rule, 
Radin also pays inadequate attention to the objective theory.241 In effect, Radin has 
foregone the opportunity to argue why her position on mutual assent deserves to 
modify general contract law. 
2. Cases Contesting Mutual Assent 
A second line of cases travels a different path from those decisions emphasizing 
the objective theory of contract, the plain meaning rule, the duty to read and finding 
consumer assent for adhesion contracts. Various decisions pre-dating her book (and 
unmentioned by Radin) actually share her concerns that mass market adhesion 
contracts do not fit the traditional model of offer and acceptance in a bargained-for 
exchange. Radin’s book would have become much more provocative if she had 
contrasted the majority rule with those decisions favoring her position.  
In a representative 1981 Missouri Court of Appeals case, the court observed:  
Our law distinguishes . . . between a contract consented to by negotiation 
and a contract assented to by adherence. The one (at least, as paradigm) 
describes a bargain between equals; the other, a form with standard terms 
imposed upon the applicant to take or leave. 
. . . . 
In an adhesion contract, . . . the assent is resembled rather than actual. The 
printed words are not enough to disclose the expectations of the parties. 
The court must look for that purpose to the full circumstances of the 
transaction whether the written words of the contract be ambiguous or 
unambiguous. 242 
Interestingly, whether the consent arises through adherence or negotiation, 
Missouri courts apply the same rules of contract construction that will implement as 
much as possible the “expectations which induced [the] agreement.”243 
Still other decisions rule that adhesion contracts are not agreements under the 
traditional bargain model. They state, With an adhesion contract, “[a]ssent and 
volition and, therefore, agreement are absent.”244 Another case observes that 
                                                                                                                                         
 241 Radin refers one time to the plain meaning rule, saying only that “[o]ne judge’s definite 
plain meaning is another judge’s incomplete interpretive morass.” RADIN, supra note 3, at 
124. Although Radin correctly states that judges sometimes disagree in contract cases, such 
disagreements on plain meaning are the exception and not probative by themselves. See also 
In re Utnehmer, 499 B.R. 705, 716 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (“An agreement is not ambiguous 
merely because the parties (or judges) disagree about its meaning.”). 
 242 Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see 
also Estrin Const. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 422 (Mo. Ct. App.1981) 
(“These [adhesive] terms are not the result of formal assent but are imposed. The other party 
does not agree to the transaction, but only adheres from want of genuine choice.”). 
 243 Spychalski, 620 S.W.2d at 392. 
 244 Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. Super. 1985); see also 
Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1180 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(“essence of assent is absent [in a contract of adhesion]”); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 
436, 442 (N.J. 1980) (“contracts of adhesion cannot be relied upon to represent a genuine 
meeting of the minds”); Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 742 P.2d 277, 282-83 (Ariz. 
1987) (“an adhesion contract is a different creature than the traditional bargained-for exchange 
of terms to which the courts apply the ordinary meeting of the minds contract rules”); Galligan 
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standard form adhesion contracts “are not, under any reasonable test, the agreement 
of the consumer or business recipient to whom they are delivered.”245 Yet another 
decision has concluded regarding adhesion clauses, “The contracting still imagined 
by courts and law teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing 
the language of their entire agreement, is no longer of much more than historical 
importance.”246 A fourth case even implicitly rejects the plain meaning rule, 
observing that “A court should disregard [the parties'] stated intent when it is 
contained in an adhesion contract.”247 These courts would seem to agree that “The 
process of entering into a contract of adhesion . . . is not one of haggle or cooperative 
process but rather of a fly and flypaper.”248  
This second line of cases echoes Radin’s refrain that contract law has lost sight 
of the moral premise that contracts are enforceable only when each side has 
voluntarily exchanged one item of value for another.249 Indeed, an Arizona case 
observes in language very close to Radin’s critique, “To apply the old rule and 
interpret such contracts according to the imagined intent of the parties is to 
perpetuate a fiction which can do no more than bring the law into ridicule.”250 These 
cases further indicate that an adhesion contract is not a sufficiently pure form of 
private ordering. By not relying on the above authorities, Radin has missed an 
opportunity to make a respectable argument that the objective theory does not 
support the existence of mutual assent in consumer mass market adhesion contracts.  
Radin also has missed that an influential tribunal has seemingly decided the 
above issue against the existence of manifested intent under the objective theory. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said in 
Williams v. First Government Mort’g. and Investors Corp. that “[w]hen a party of 
little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially 
unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that 
his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all 
the terms.”251 Put another way, the Williams court indicated that a reasonable party 
                                                                                                                                         
v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1966) (exculpatory clause did not represent a meeting of 
the minds but in effect was a mere contract of adhesion). 
 245 Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J. 1992). 
 246 C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173, 175 (Iowa 1975). 
 247 Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 411 n.8 (Mass. 2013). 
 248 Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491 (Mont. 2009) (citing A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 1.4, 13–14 (rev. ed. 1998)). 
 249 RADIN, Boilerplate, supra note 3, at 15. 
 250 Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 399 (Ariz. 
1984). 
 251 Williams v. First Gov’t Mort’g. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added). Accord In re Strong, 356 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing 
Willliams, 225 F.3d 738). See also Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
610 F.2d 1174, 1180 (3d Cir.1979) (“[t]he dominant party realizes that the weaker party's 
assent is not genuine”). The Arizona Supreme Court observed in Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1987): 
[C]ourts will enforce a boilerplate term unless the drafter had reason to believe that 
the adhering party would not have assented to the particular term had he or she known 
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in the position of the seller, knowing that consumers rarely if ever read and 
understand the particular mass market contract of adhesion, would not necessarily 
construe the consumer’s acceptance of the contract as manifesting concurrence.252 
The traditional run of cases rarely, if ever, attempts to rebut this argument and Radin 
does not reference this helpful D.C. Circuit case in her analysis.  
While the D.C. Circuit in Williams essentially rejected the existence of consumer 
assent in adhesion contracts under the objective theory, the case could be 
distinguishable. The court strongly indicated that the contract was unconscionable 
based on the consumer’s “[l]ack of education, his ability to understand the 
transaction, his overall bargaining power, and the fairness of the merchant’s sales 
practices.”253 By definition, no meaningful assent occurs with an unconscionable 
contract. 254 Thus, this decision arguably offers inconclusive support for the Radin 
viewpoint. 
Although generally a pro-merchant policy, the duty to read doctrine255 in one 
iteration comports with Radin’s position. In contesting the use of the objective 
theory for adhesion contracts, Radin could have profitably cited those decisions that 
lessen the duty to read either when the party signs an adhesion contract256 or when 
enforcing the duty to read would be “unfair under the circumstance” or cause “great 
                                                                                                                                         
of its presence. The drafter's reason to believe that the adhering party would not have 
assented to the term can be shown through prior negotiations or inferred from various 
facts. 
Id. at 283; see also Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The concept of 
adhesion contracts introduces the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden of contract enforcement. 
At the very least, it represents a serious challenge to orthodox contract law that a contract is to 
be interpreted in accordance with the objective manifestation of the parties’ intent.”). 
 252 On a related point, as one commentator points out, many consumers would rather be 
rationally ignorant of an adhesion contract than to take the time and trouble to read and 
understand all terms: 
Faced with preprinted terms whose effect the form taker knows he will find difficult 
or impossible to fully understand, which involve risks that probably will never mature, 
which are unlikely to be worth the cost of search and processing, and which probably 
aren't subject to revision in any event, a rational form taker will typically decide to 
remain ignorant of the preprinted terms. 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
211, 243 (1995). 
 253 Williams, 225 F.3d at 749 (remanding to district court on these issues) 
 254 See generally Ex parte Foster, 758 So.2d 516, 520 n.4 (Ala.1999) (unconscionability is 
a “deficiency in the contract-formation process result[ing] in a lack of meaningful assent”). 
 255 See Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1967) (“the law 
presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and understands at 
least the literal meaning of its terms”); Vincent v. Palmer, 19 A.2d 183, 189 (Md. 1941) 
(stating that, “as a general rule, when one signs a release or other instrument, he is presumed 
in law to have read and understood its contents, and he will not be protected against an unwise 
agreement”). 
 256 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 785 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); see 
also Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 369 (Pa. 1977) (given the adhesive 
nature of an insurance policy the insured is under no duty to read the document).  
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hardship.”257 These courts further reason in an exception to the duty to read that 
“[w]here a contractual provision would defeat the ‘strong’ expectation of the weaker 
party, it may also be necessary [for the merchant] to call [the consumer’s] attention 
to the language of the provision.258 Indeed, under New Jersey case law, an insurer 
must disclose to the insured those policy terms that might vary from the insured’s 
reasonable expectations.259 Thus, Radin overlooks that some cases in certain 
instances lessen the importance of the duty to read as a barrier for consumers seeking 
to overturn their adhesion contracts.  
Apart from these qualifications to the duty to read, even when the contract terms 
are unambiguous, Radin could have argued further that those jurisdictions strictly 
relying upon the four corners rule regarding the contract document, the objective 
theory, and the duty to read, employ an overly formalistic approach without due 
consideration for the surrounding circumstances of contract formation and 
performance.260 These latter decisions indicate that they will not perform contract 
construction in an “unreal” (and even “fictitious”) manner.261 This broader view of 
contract-as-transaction could support the position that irrespective of dry words on 
inert paper, the particular parties in the full context of their living relationship never 
intended a free and open transaction. Authority also exists for the proposition that 
the duty to read merely states a rebuttable presumption that cannot stand where 
dispelled by direct uncontradicted evidence that the person never read the document 
in question.262  
Ultimately, the policy and legal and policy argument can be made that 
notwithstanding the objective theory, when a court finds that a party has ignorantly 
signed a contract, and the other party knows it or has reason to know it, then 
enforcement of such a contract undermines reliance on the stability of commercial 
transactions. As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,  
The [problem is that the] written term asserted by one party is contained 
in a form contract, in circumstances where the party asserting the term has 
no reasonable basis to believe that the other party had knowingly or 
                                                                                                                                         
 257 Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 258 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785. 
 259 Bowler v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 250 A.2d 580, 588 (N.J. 1969). 
 260 A number of courts give these extrinsic considerations important weight. See Muchesko 
v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21, 24 (Ariz. App. 1997) (in determining mutual assent, courts may 
consider the language of the agreement, the parties’ conduct and other circumstances); Adler 
v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784 (Wash. 2004) (Under the “context rule” a court 
determines “the intent of the parties by viewing the contract as a whole, which includes the 
subject matter and intent of the contract, examination of the circumstances surrounding its 
formation, subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, the reasonableness of the respective 
interpretations advanced by the parties, and statements made by the parties during preliminary 
negotiations, trade usage, and/or course of dealing.”). For additional discussion of this 
“context rule” of interpretation, see Goldstein, supra note 102, at 94-111. 
 261 Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1976) (using the 
quoted terms). Compare Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35, 42 (Mich. 2005) 
(applying plain meaning rule to adhesion contracts). 
 262 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 791 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
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would knowingly assent to the term. In such circumstances, enforcement 
of the written term does not further the policies underlying contract law, 
[which are] to “promot[e] and facilitat[e] reliance on business 
agreements.”263 
B. Explaining Mutual Assent when Actual Agreement is Missing 
If various courts under the second line of authority accept that agreement is 
missing for adhesion contracts, how do these decisions rationalize the existence of 
mutual assent? The possible obstacle here is that if there is no evidence of mutual 
assent, then there is no contract and no agreement to enforce by either side.264 While 
Radin cites no case law either way on this issue, the decisions--which predate her 
book--do address this problem.  
Some cases indicate that consent is merely assumed: 
[Consumers] trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the 
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others 
similarly situated. But they understand that they are assenting to the terms 
not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may 
impose.265 
Citing the example of insurance policies, courts in another line of cases concede 
that mutual consent is missing for adhesion contracts and that it is necessary to 
substitute for consent the role of public expectations and commercially-accepted 
standards: 
By traditional standards of contract law, the consent of both parties, based 
on an informed understanding of the terms and conditions of the contract, 
is rarely present in insurance contracts.... Because understanding is 
lacking, the consent necessary to sustain traditional contracts cannot be 
presumed to exist in most contracts of insurance. Such consent can be 
inferred only to the extent that the policy language conforms to public 
expectations and commercially reasonable standards. . . . In instances in 
which the insurance contract is inconsistent with public expectations and 
commercially accepted standards, judicial regulation of insurance 
contracts is essential in order to prevent overreaching and injustice.266 
Still other courts in finding a binding agreement reason that the merchant creates 
consent through de facto legislation. The argument here centers on the point that one 
predominant unilateral will—the merchant’s—effectively legislates terms to an 
                                                                                                                                         
 263 Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1052 (D.C. App. 1996) (emphasis 
added).  
 264 Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 42 n.84; see also Muchesko, 955 P.2d at 24 (“mutual assent is an 
essential element of any enforceable contract”). 
 265 State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 274 (W. Va. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. 
Broadnax, 537 S.E.2d 882, 898 (W. Va. 2000)) (Starcher, J., concurring). 
 266 Vargas v. Calabrese, 714 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing New Jersey 
decisions); see also Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 415 A.2d 1156, 1165 (N.J. 1980) 
(“There being no private consent to support a contract of adhesion, its legitimacy rests entirely 
on its compliance with standards in the public interest.”). 
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undetermined number of persons rather than to just one individual; accordingly, 
these adhesive instruments are more akin to “[a] law rather than a meeting of the 
minds.”267  
What can we make of these cases conceding the lack of conventional mutual 
assent to adhesion contracts but enforcing them anyway? From a strict theoretical 
perspective, the decisions contesting the lack of mutual assent with adhesion 
contracts could be flawed—they say the consumer does not give sufficient assent but 
they hold him bound nonetheless under consent-substitutes, such as public 
expectations and commercially reasonable standards or de facto legislation. So, the 
following question may be asked: If a court rejects the plain meaning rule, and also 
rejects consent substitutes such as de facto legislation, is there a theory that 
accurately reflects the realities of adhesion contracts consistent with the traditional 
objective doctrine of assent? 
C. Llewellyn’s Theory of “Blanket Assent”  
For many years, courts and commentators have considered the theory of buyer 
consent for adhesion contracts. In reality, some say, the consumer in a contract of 
adhesion generally assents only to the few dickered terms, such as price, delivery, or 
quantity.268 As for the rest of the terms—which the consumer likely leaves unread or 
not understood—Professor Karl Llewellyn, who was a legal realist and the principal 
drafter of Article Two of the U.C.C., proposed one such theory. Followed by a few 
courts, the basis for his construct is the consumer gives the merchant “blanket 
assent.”  
The above theory holds that the consumer assents in principle to the arrangement 
except to unreasonable or indecent terms that would alter or eviscerate the 
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.269 Llewellyn observed:  
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can 
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.270 
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, 
and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one 
thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not 
unreasonable or indecent terms . . .which do not alter or eviscerate the 
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.271 The fine print which has not 
been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those 
                                                                                                                                         
 267 Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir.1955) (Frank, J., dissenting) 
(cited with approval in Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 530 (3d Cir.1970)); 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960); State ex rel. Dunlap v. 
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 273 n.4 (W. Va. 2002).  
 268 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract 
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 769-70 (2002). 
 269 Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 618 (Iowa 
1984) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION—DECIDING APPEALS 370 
(1960)). 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
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dickered which constitutes the dominant and only real expression of 
agreement. . . .272  
The Llewellyn “blanket assent” theory comports with the rational, social, and 
cognitive facts that consumers characteristically do not read standardized terms 
because of the well-known problem of transaction costs and the consumer’s 
difficulties in understanding and interpreting complex documents.273 Simply put, the 
typical consumer “satisfices:” he or she responds to the overwhelming information 
costs and tries to make “[a] satisfactory choice by sacrificing inquiry into certain 
features in favor of pursuing inquiry into few, salient others.”274 As one 
commentator has pointed out, however, “Llewellyn's theory thus stands out as a 
rejection of the strict application of the objective theory of contract formation and 
the duty to read as applied to consumer form contracts . . . .”275 The reason is that 
Llewellyn’s theory holds “unreasonable” terms unenforceable despite “external 
indications of assent.”276 Llewellyn’s implicit disavowal of the objective theory of 
contract probably explains why it has so few judicial adherents and only passing 
importance in the area of boilerplate and mutual assent.277  
Without comment on Llewellyn’s partial rejection of the objective doctrine, 
Radin prominently mentions Llewellyn’s blanket assent theory.278 She argues that it 
has significantly contributed to the deterioration of party assent such that it takes on 
fictional forms of voluntariness.279 Even though Radin and other commentators 
certainly emphasize Llewellyn’s theory,280 only a few courts explicitly accept the 
                                                                                                                                         
 272 Id.; Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1987) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION—DECIDING 
APPEALS 370 (1960)). For a good discussion, see Robert M. Lloyd, The “Circle of Assent” 
Doctrine: An Important Innovation in Contract Law, 7 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 237 
(2006). 
 273 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 88, at 463; Lonegrass, supra note 1, at 33 
(“psychologists who study consumer cognition and decision making have demonstrated that 
consumers suffer from a range of limitations on their capability to understand the risks 
inherent in contracting”). 
 274 James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 161, 177 (2013). 
 275 Lonegrass, supra note 1, at 42. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Llewellyn’s theory also has much in common with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
211(3) and cmt. f (1981), which states that a consumer does not assent to a form contract term 
if “the other party has reason to believe that the [consumer] would not have accepted the 
agreement if he had known that the agreement contained the particular term.” Stephen J. 
Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With A Contractualist Reply to 
Carrington & Hagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 202 (1998). As another commentator 
points out, however, Section 211 has gained comparatively few judicial adherents. Barnes, 
Fairer Model, supra note 2, at 249-50 (noting that most cases are from Arizona and that most 
deal with insurance policy disputes). 
 278 RADIN, supra note 3, 82. 
 279 Id. at 30, 82-84. 
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Llewellyn notion excusing the consumer from “unreasonable” or “indecent” 
terms.281 Instead, the contemporary interpretation is that the real value of the 
Llewellyn’s theory is the contribution to the unconscionability defense. 282  
D. Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and Browsewrap: Purported or Actual Contracts? 
Radin saves much of her criticism of “purported” boilerplate contracts for 
shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap in computer software and Internet 
transactions.283 While the authorities are not unanimous, a number of courts and 
commentators have characterized all three types as adhesion contracts. 284  
“Shrinkwrap agreements “typically involve[ ] (1) notice of a license agreement 
on product packaging (i.e., the shrinkwrap), (2) presentation of the full license on 
documents inside the package, and (3) prohibited access to the product without an 
express indication of acceptance.”285 A “clickwrap agreement” occurs where a 
website user typically clicks an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of 
terms and conditions of use.286 A “browsewrap agreement” occurs when website 
terms and conditions of use are prominently posted on the website, typically as a 
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen. 287 Hybrid arrangements of these products are 
also possible.288 Despite the differences in these agreements, “[t]he central issue is 
the same: whether the consumer manifested the necessary assent to make a valid and 
                                                                                                                                         
 280 Id.; see also, e.g., Jarrod Wong, Arbitrating in the Ether of Intent, 40 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
165, 193 (2012); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L REV. 743, 746-52 
(2002). 
 281 Only two jurisdictions appear to adopt the Llwellyn doctrine. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 618 (Iowa 1984); Parton v. Mark Pirtle 
Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 282 See, e.g., Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 283 RADIN, supra note 3, at 10-12. 
 284 E.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988); Batya 
Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink–Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrinkwrap Agreement as an 
Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 321 (1999) (shrinkwrap); TradeComet.com 
LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Timothy J. Calloway, Cloud 
Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation on Liability Clauses: A Perfect Storm?, 11 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 163, 168-69 (2012) (clickwrap); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in 
Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
1041, 1053 (2005) (browsewrap). 
 285 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428-29 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 286 Hines v. Overstock.com, 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 287 Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 428-29; Zaltz v. JDATE, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 452 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). “Such terms of use often begin with a statement that use or browsing of the 
web site constitutes agreement to the terms, hence the name “browse-wrap.” Juliet M. 
Moringiello, supra note 164, at 1318; see also Oakley, supra note 284, at 1050-61 (comparing 
shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap agreements).  
 288 See, e.g., Vernon v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1149-50 (D. 
Colo. 2012) (clickwrap/browsewrap combination). 
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enforceable contract.”289 Absent a violation of a rule of positive law or a finding of 
unconscionability, shrinkwrap agreements are “generally enforceable.”290  
In this section, I will focus on shrinkwrap agreements (even as these agreements 
have elements of assent in common with clickwrap and browsewrap). To facilitate 
the analysis, I will rely extensively upon the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit’s comprehensive decision in Schnabel v. Trilegant.291 This decision 
provides an outstanding discussion of mutual assent in online contracting and merits 
an extensive treatment. Notably, the Schnabel court relied on established common 
law principles to decide contracts based on new computer technology.  
With a shrinkwrap license, the Second Circuit observed, where the consumer has 
purchased and received the package, the offer will be enforceable upon the 
consumer’s failure to return the item after reading, or having a realistic opportunity 
to read, the contract’s terms and conditions.292 Thus, the offer commonly is not that 
the consumer will be bound to the agreement (and the license terms) where he 
consents and pays at the time of purchase. Instead, the merchant’s offer generally is 
that the consumer may have the item and will be held to the license if he pays now 
and takes later action confirming his acceptance of the offer.293  
Regarding the legal effect of shrinkwrap, the court said, these instruments are 
enforceable depending upon the parties' outward manifestations of assent as 
interpreted through an objective standard of review.294 A party may exhibit his assent 
through words or silence, action or inaction, but with one important qualification: 
“[t]he conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he 
intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other 
                                                                                                                                         
 289 William J. Condon, Jr., Note, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts 
Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 434-35 
(2003/2004); see also Vernon, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; Traton News, LLC v. Traton Corp., 
914 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (clickwrap agreement is formed when the website 
visitor is required to explicitly manifest assent to the website’s terms and conditions by 
requiring some affirmative act (e.g., clicking “I agree” or entering one's initials) before the 
visitor can proceed further on the website); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 129 
(2d Cir. 2012); Zaltz, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (“[C]ourts have enforced browsewrap 
agreements where the website users must have had actual or constructive notice of the site’s 
terms, and have manifested their assent to them.”). Compare Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] reference to the existence of license terms on a 
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of 
those terms.”).   
 290 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Wold v. Dell Fin. Servs., 
L.P., 598 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (D. Minn. 2009) (courts routinely enforce so-called 
‘shrinkwrap’ accept-or-return arbitration agreements); 15B AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the 
Internet § 106 (2011). In the federal circuits, shrinkwrap agreements are valid and enforceable 
contracts. TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. SND Cellular, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1259 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010).  
 291 See Schnabel, 697 F.3d 110. 
 292 Id. at 122. 
 293 Id. at 121-22. Accord Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 
2004).  
 294 Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 119. 
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party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”295 Thus, a person who accepts the 
benefit of services rendered may be held to have impliedly made a promise through 
conduct to pay for them . . . [if] the offeree . . . knew or had reason to know that the 
party performing expected compensation.”296 
The Schnabel court also said the major problem in these cases is the consumer’s 
assent is largely passive in terms of an overt response.297 Thus, the question of the 
buyer’s acceptance of the license terms frequently turns on whether a reasonably 
prudent consumer (offeree) would be on notice of the term at issue. This principle is 
tied to the general common law rule that an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer 
unless the offeree first knows of its existence and all of its terms.298 To add to these 
complexities, the consumer in litigation will usually deny having actual notice of the 
term.299 Therefore, each case is fact specific regarding the offeree’s notice of the 
terms in question.300  
Schnabel further noted that under settled common law principles, an offeree is 
bound by the shrinkwrap provisions if he or she is on “inquiry notice” of the 
terms.301 In other words, the person has actual notice of circumstances adequate to 
place upon a prudent person an obligation to make further inquiry into the matter. 
                                                                                                                                         
 295 Id. at 120 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §19(2)). 
 296 Id. at 119-21. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(a) (1981). Peter 
Linzer properly points out that courts have neglected the issue of default terms in relation to 
adhesion contracts. Peter Linzer, “Implied,” “Inferred,” and “Imposed”: Default Rules and 
Adhesion Contracts—The Need for Radical Surgery, 28 PACE L. REV. 195 (2008). 
 297 Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120. 
 298 Id. at 121. 
 299 Id. at 120. 
 300 Regarding these software and on-line transactions, Radin emphatically states her 
concerns that courts have distorted the concept of mutual assent by allowing proof of the 
consumer’s “sheer ignorance”: i.e., a person does not know what, if anything, is happening as 
his rights are being divested. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 21-23, 87. She singles out 
browsewrap and rolling contracts (money now and terms later) as supposed examples of this 
phenomenon. Id. at 22, 88. Radin later acknowledges, however, that courts do not enforce 
these contracts where the consumer is totally unaware that his rights are being divested 
because she concedes that the courts require that the consumer knew or should have known of 
the terms. See id. at 93 n.21 (citing Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28-34 
(2d Cir. 2002) (browsewrap case)). Radin further leaves out that cases such as Specht tie their 
analysis to evaluating the browsewrap under traditional contract principles of offer, 
acceptance, and the consumer’s manifestation of assent to the merchant. Id. at 28-34. No cases 
were found where a court bound a party under circumstances of “sheer ignorance” in Radin’s 
parlance and Radin’s conclusory comment otherwise is unpersuasive. 
Other courts also couch their approval in this area on the consumer’s manifestation of mutual 
assent. See AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., No. 7:13CV00035, 2013 WL 5963034, at *8 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2013) (browsewrap case); see also Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Group, 
LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 790 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 
2d 927, 937 (E.D. Va. 2010). For cases upholding “money now and terms later” contracts and 
finding the consumer’s consent, see, for example, Schacter v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 140 (D. Mass. 2006) (citing decisions). 
 301 Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 126. 
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The consumer will thereby be bound if his conduct thereafter would convince a 
reasonable observer that the consumer’s conduct manifests assent. The clarity and 
conspicuousness of the license term can be determinative in leading to such a 
conclusion, along with the course of dealing between the parties and the impact of 
industry practices.302  
The above principles align with the concept that the seller (when acting as the 
offeror) is “master of the offer” and can prescribe the terms of acceptance.303 Thus, 
the courts’ treatment of shrinkwrap comports with the settled common law doctrine 
that “[w]hen a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a 
decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking 
constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the 
offeree.”304 
Besides being consistent with established common law principles, current 
practice on shrinkwrap avoids undue transaction costs as it helps facilitate a 
smoothly running economy: 
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air 
transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical 
considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms 
with their products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents 
to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the 
phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-
page statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the 
droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential 
buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. An 
                                                                                                                                         
 302 Id. at 120. 
 303 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). Radin correctly views 
the seller as the offeror and the buyer as the offeree. RADIN, supra note 3, at 86. The UCC 
default rule is the converse, except the UCC recognizes that where the circumstances 
unambiguously so demonstrate, the seller will be the offeror and the buyer is the offeree. See, 
e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000); Stenzel v. Dell, 
Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140 (Me. 2005); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1067 (R.I. 2009) 
(construing U.C.C. § 2-204). Merchants characteristically get around this issue in almost all 
online and computer software transactions by having the customer sign a terms document in 
the store or by having the customer click “I agree” on the browsewrap before paying. By 
definition, the party that states “I agree” or “I accept” is the offeree. See Register.com, Inc. v. 
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2000); Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 
572 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Or. 1977). For commentary disagreeing with the Hill approach to the 
sellers being the master of the offer, see Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad 
Economics, Bad Morals, And A Bad Idea For A Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook 
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 641 (2004). 
 304 Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 128; Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403; Burcham v. Expedia, 
Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009 WL 586513, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009); see also Leon 
Trakman, The Boundaries of Contract Law in Cyberspace, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187, 201 
(2008): 
There is nothing remarkable in the observation that judges construe wrap contracts in 
accordance with whether the parties have a serious intention to contract, as distinct from their 
motive in contracting. Nor can one reasonably object to courts deciding on the basis of 
objective evidence whether purchasers have assented to material terms in their contracts. 
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oral recitation would not avoid customers' assertions (whether true or 
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not 
remember or understand it. Writing provides benefits for both sides of 
commercial transactions. Customers as a group are better off when 
vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and 
use instead a simple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are 
bound by such documents, read or unread.305 
As indicated above, shrinkwrap licenses are generally enforceable.306 
Nevertheless, some courts have struck down shrinkwrap licenses. These decisions 
usually reason that these instruments are unacceptable pursuant to the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and Section 2-207 with its policy on the battle of the 
forms between offeror and offeree and the effect in this situation of the offeree’s 
attempted imposition of additional terms upon acceptance.307  
The cases relying on the binding effect of the Code and U.C.C. § 2-207 (which 
are two different issues) are not persuasive. The U.C.C. applies only to the sale of 
goods308 (and it should be noted that the Second Circuit in Schnabel never referenced 
the U.C.C.). By definition, the Code does not apply, as here, to a pure license 
agreement where no transfer of title occurs with the subject matter of the 
transaction.309 Even if the Code applies, the majority rule appears to be that U.C.C. § 
2-207 is not applicable because the offeree does not submit a form in response to the 
offer.310 According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
the leading case, ProCD, there can be no “battle of the forms” under the text of 
U.C.C. § 2-207 with only one document from a single party.311 More appropriately, 
                                                                                                                                         
 305 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. For additional discussion of the practical reasons for upholding 
shrinkwrap agreements, see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief 
Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
335 (1996). 
 306 See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 307 See Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 752-54 (Kan. 2006) 
(citing decisions). 
 308 Geneva Int’l. Corp. v. Petrof, Spol, S.R.O., 608 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2009); 
see also U.C.C. § 2-102 (unless the context otherwise requires, Article 2 applies to 
transactions in goods); U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (defining contract for sale to include both a present 
sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time; the term “sale” consists in the 
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price).  
 309 See Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 697, 698 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(citing decisions). But see Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. 
Supp. 235, 238-39 (D.N.H. 1993) (transactions in goods under U.C.C. § 2-102 includes 
license agreements in computer software) (citing authorities). See generally Holly K. Towle, 
Enough Already: It is Time to Acknowledge that U.C.C. Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software 
and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531 (2011). 
 310 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 311 Id. Contra Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (No 
requirement for two parties’ forms under U.C.C. § 2-207 because comment one states that § 2-
207 will apply “where an agreement has been reached orally . . . and is followed by one or 
both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far agreed and adding 
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if the U.C.C. is applicable, the correct method of analysis is to rely upon U.C.C. § 2-
204(1) for the concept that the seller may invite acceptance of its offer, and thereby 
form a contract, where the agreement arises based on the shrinkwrap terms and not 
the consumer’s payment.312 Thus, the ProCD court cited U.C.C. § 2-606, the section 
defining acceptance of goods, whereby the consumer’s failure to reject the software 
as prescribed by the offer implied his acceptance of the item and its terms.313 
In a cautionary note, the Schnabel court correctly concluded, “While new 
commerce on the Internet [and elsewhere] has exposed courts to many new 
situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”314 Radin 
does not address in any depth the above common law or U.C.C. doctrines. She also 
overlooks that these bedrock principles as applied to the new modes of commerce 
are a sound fit. These case law doctrines are not predicated on any theory of 
“hypothetical” or “fictional” consent as she alleges, but are based instead on 
enforcing the objectively manifested assent and effectuating the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.  
E. Resolution of the Conflicting Decisions  
As compared with the majority view supporting bona fide mutual assent for 
adhesion contracts, the minority position challenging the existence of consent for 
these contracts is not persuasive. The minority rule has erred by stating that “quite 
apart” from the existence of any ambiguity, or the written words of the contract, 
“The printed words are not enough to disclose the expectations of the parties.”315 
The correct position is that the printed words and their plain meaning are generally 
adequate under the objective doctrine to establish mutual assent. In effect, the 
minority line of decisions requires proof of the consumer’s subjective knowing 
assent.316 Accordingly, the minority position directly contradicts the established test, 
                                                                                                                                         
terms not discussed.”); 1 JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT E SUMMERS & ROBERT HILLMAN, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2:33 (6th ed. 2013) (disagreeing with ProCD). 
 312 See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452.  
 313 Id. at 1452 (“A buyer accepts goods under § 2-606(1)(b) when, after an opportunity to 
inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection under § 2-602(1).”). While ProCD is the 
majority rule, DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069 (R.I. 2009), some courts follow a 
different doctrine. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan.2000) (buyer’s 
keeping of the computer beyond five days insufficient to demonstrate agreement to the 
standard terms). 
 314 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.2012); see also Specht v. 
Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28-30 (2d Cir. 2002) (evaluating validity of an 
internet contract under traditional contract principles of offer, acceptance, and the 
manifestation of assent). 
 315 Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 393-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see 
also supra Part IV.A (comparing majority and minority positions). 
 316 For a specific example of this inappropriate approach, see NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. 
v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 790-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (“Because 
arbitration provisions are often embedded in contracts of adhesion, courts take particular care 
in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual understanding of 
the ramifications of that assent.” (emphasis added)); see also Peoples Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Nat'l 
Mortg. Ass'n, 856 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (similar statement). 
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which looks to “objective” manifestations of “voluntary mutual assent” through the 
medium of the contract document in the context of “an offer and reciprocal 
acceptance.”317  
Furthermore, the minority position overlooks the prevailing rule, “The only 
intent of the parties to a contract which is essential is an intent to say the words and 
do the acts which constitute their manifestation of assent;”318 agreement does not 
“consist of harmonious intentions or states of mind . . . .”319 When the parties affix 
voluntary signatures on a document unambiguously presented to them known to be a 
contract, and no recognized defense upsets the legal existence of joint assent, no real 
question should exist on mutual assent.  
This last argument draws support from the theory that adhesion contracts with a 
knowing exchange of money for goods or services are a contractual “bargain” in the 
sense of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The Restatement defines a “bargain” 
as an “[a]greement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a 
performance or to exchange performances.”320 In this respect, a bargain is also 
commonly a contract where it provides “[a] remedy for its breach or recognize 
performance as a legal duty.”321 Therefore, when a consumer knowingly pays for a 
service or product after signing what he understands to be a contract, even if there is 
some form of economic pressure, or if the consumer is not fully conversant with all 
terms, it is difficult to contend under a flexible but realistic view of the law that there 
is no “bargain” (and no “contract”) in the sense of the Restatement.322  
Besides reflecting the legal tenets of the objective doctrine (including the plain 
meaning rule and the duty to read and understand a contract), and qualifying as an 
                                                                                                                                         
 317 Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 18 (1981)). The courts commonly apply the standard objective test 
to insurance policies, e.g., Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d 999, 1002 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010), which courts have construed as a category of adhesion contracts, e.g., 
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fleekop, 682 So. 2d 620, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 318 Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 319 Devlin v. Ingrum, 928 F.2d 1084, 1095 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Lilley v. Gonzales, 417 
So.2d 161, 163 (Ala. 1982)). 
 320 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981) (construed in Franklin Fed. Sav. 
Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 321 See Daniel P. O’Gorman, Redefining Offer in Contract Law, 82 MISS. L.J. 1049, 1054 
(2013) (noting definition of “contract” under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 
(1981)). 
 322 Cf. Sherman v. Lunsford, 723 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (“Although the 
parties may not have fully understood the legal significance of each and every term, they 
knew they were signing a binding contract.”); see also Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Form contracts, and standard clauses in individually 
negotiated contracts, enable enormous savings in transaction costs, and the abuses to which 
they occasionally give rise can be controlled without altering traditional doctrines, provided 
those doctrines are interpreted flexibly, realistically.”). 
If one were to take literally Radin’s argument that World B contracts are not contracts, then 
she would need to concede that the law should not recognize a remedy for their breach 
committed by either party. I doubt Radin would subscribe to leaving consumers in such a 
lurch. 
52https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/7
2014] MASS MARKET STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 425 
 
enforceable bargain, the majority doctrine draws support from the strong policies of 
the sanctity of contract and the need for preserving commercial stability.323 It also 
implements the rule that wherever possible, courts should strive to uphold, rather 
than to defeat, an otherwise binding contract.324 As the decisions recognize,  
In the overwhelming majority of circumstances, contractual promises are 
to be performed, not avoided: pacta sunt servanda, or, as the Seventh 
Circuit loosely translated it, “a deal’s a deal.” This is an eminently sound 
doctrine, because typically. . . [A] court cannot improve matters by 
intervention after the fact. It can only destabilize the institution of 
contract, increase risk, and make parties worse off. . . .325 
Therefore, where the issue is in doubt, the majority position is sounder than the 
minority rule because the prevailing test better promotes the fundamental values of 
the contracting system.  
V. MUTUAL ASSENT AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Unconscionability is an affirmative defense to the enforcement of a contract and 
is an exception to the duty to read and understand the document.326 Briefly put, an 
unconscionable contract “[i]s one which no man in his senses, not under delusion, 
would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man would accept, on 
the other.”327 Radin believes that contemporary adherents to classical contract 
                                                                                                                                         
 323 See generally Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasizing policies underlying sanctity of contract as a “civilizing concept”); Universal 
Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 589 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasizing the “necessity 
of preserving predictability and stability in commercial transactions”). 
 324 See supra note 209. 
 325 Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 434, 437 
(W.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng’g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1010 
(7th Cir.1996)).  
Val D. Ricks makes the interesting argument that “assent is not an element of contract 
formation.” See Val D. Ricks, Assent is not an Element of Contract Formation, 61 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 591, 593 (2013). He writes, “[b]ecause assent can exist without consideration but 
consideration, when it exists, necessarily implies assent, of these two parts of contract 
formation consideration is the one both necessary and fundamental. So long as the law 
requires consideration, an additional assent requirement is superfluous.” 
Professor Ricks acknowledges, however, that almost all authorities take the opposite view, id. 
at 591-93, and so it is quite unlikely that his “No Assent/Consideration” argument would work 
in a litigated case. 
 326 Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 331 (1st Cir. 2000); Graham v. 
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981); Todd Heller, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 
754 A.2d 689, 700 (Pa. Super. 2000); Bayne v. Smith, 965 A.2d 265 (Pa. Super. 2009). 
Rescission can be a proper basis for relief from an unconscionable contract. E.g., In re 
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 883 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Compare 
Sprague v. Quality Rests. Nw., Inc. 162 P.3d 331, 334 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“Unconscionability may involve deception, compulsion, or lack of genuine consent, although 
usually not to the extent that would justify rescission under the principles applicable to that 
remedy.”).  
 327 Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc., 721 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Conn. 1998). 
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doctrine interpret unconscionability narrowly, focusing on the procedural aspect and 
discounting the substantive one.328 Unconscionability, she says, is a process of 
“relentless” case by case adjudication which makes cases extremely unpredictable 
and not a strong defense to abusive boilerplate.329 As will be shown below, Radin’s 
recitation is wanting in key respects.  
Hard bargaining differs from unconscionable oppression. Even a strongly pro-
vendor-friendly clause can be completely legitimate, stem from perfectly natural and 
moral self-interest, and therefore rest beyond the reach of the unconscionability 
defense.330 As one court observed, “[T]he law attaches no onus to any party which 
takes full advantage of the strengths of his bargaining position.”331 To the same end, 
the U.C.C. section on the defense states the general policy of the law is to prevent 
oppression and unfair surprise but not to disturb the allocation of risks because of 
one side’s superior bargaining power.332 Only where the pro-seller clause is one-
sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising as opposed to being a “simple old 
fashioned bad bargain” could the issue rise to the level of unconscionability.333 
Because of this high bar, an adhesion contract is not necessarily unconscionable.334  
The unconscionability doctrine generously favors the consumer in various 
respects. To establish this defense to contract enforcement, the movant as explained 
below must show both procedural unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability—even as this borderline is often blurred.335  
Procedural unconscionability deals with procedural deficiencies in the contract 
formation process, such as seller deception or a refusal to bargain over contract 
terms, which thereby caused the imposed-upon party to lack meaningful choice 
about whether and how to enter into the transaction.336 This element of 
                                                                                                                                         
 328 Radin cites no cases for the claim that courts focus unduly on the procedural element 
and discount the substantive requirement. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 125. Compare 
Lonegrass, supra note 1 (“[V]ery few courts have actually invalidated contracts on the basis of 
purely procedural defects.”). In fact, one commentator says that “[w]ith respect to most 
adhesive arbitration agreements, the focus is entirely on substantive unconscionability.” 
Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular 
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006). 
 329 RADIN, supra note 3, at 129. 
 330 Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 815 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J., 
dissenting). 
 331 Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 686 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975). 
 332 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 333 Hathaway v. Eckerle, 336 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Ky. 2011). 
 334 Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743 (Md. 2005); Todd Heller, Inc. v. United 
Parcel Serv., 754 A.2d 689, 700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Bayne v. Smith, 965 A.2d 265, 270 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). 
 335 Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W.Va. 2012). For most 
courts, both elements are required and the absence of either element will defeat the claim. 
Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003); Ulbrich v. 
Overstock.com, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 924, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2012). But see Lonegrass, supra 
note 1 (noting cases upholding defense based on one element or the other). 
 336 Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731 (Ala. 2002); see also Bank of Ind., N.A. v. 
Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109-10 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (indicators of procedural 
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unconscionability can include various deficiencies, such as party illiteracy, hidden or 
unduly complex contract terms, or unfair bargaining tactics.337 Substantive 
unconscionability pertains to the contract terms and whether they are unreasonably 
favorable to the more powerful party, such as where the terms contravene public 
policy.338 Both elements need not be present in the same degree.339 
After they assess the presence of both elements, courts typically apply a “sliding 
scale” mode of analysis; thus, the more evidence of substantive unconscionability, 
the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to establish the defense, 
and vice versa.340 While an adhesion contract is often procedurally 
unconscionable,341 this fact does not automatically mandate a finding of substantive 
unconscionability.342 In sum, the unconscionability defense has two essential 
elements: (1) terms that are grossly favorable to a party that has (2) overwhelming 
bargaining power343 under the particular facts.344 
One of Radin’s major concerns—the relation of unconscionability, adhesion 
contracts, and contractual arbitration—arises frequently in the cases.345 In many 
respects, the law favors the weaker party. Thus, in one example, a primary indicator 
of procedural unconscionability is whether the consumer must agree to an arbitration 
clause before he can obtain the product or service.346 More specifically, an arbitration 
provision within “a contract of adhesion renders the agreement procedurally 
unconscionable where the stronger party's terms are unnegotiable and ‘the weaker 
party is prevented by market factors, timing[,] or other pressures from being able to 
                                                                                                                                         
unconscionability generally fall into two areas: (1) lack of knowledge, and (2) lack of 
voluntariness). 
 337 Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006). 
 338 Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 731; see also Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. at 109-10 
(extensive treatment of substantive unconscionability). 
 339 Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009). 
 340 Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 2012). 
 341 Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 
Brown, 729 S.E.2d at 228 (stating that procedural unconscionability “often begins with a 
contract of adhesion”); see also Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985) (noting parallels between unconscionability and fraud). 
 342 Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743 (Md. 2005). 
 343 Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc. v. Kilpatric, 966 So. 2d 273, 285 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). 
 344 Ex parte Foster, 758 S.2d 516, 520 n.4 (Ala. 1999). 
 345 RADIN, supra note 3, at 125-28, 278-79 n.21. Compare Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit 
Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating arbitration clause that exempts the 
merchant but not the consumer from arbitration is most likely to be unconscionable); Ticknor 
v Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc, 265 F.3d 931, 940-41 (9th Cir 2001) (finding an arbitration clause 
allowing the drafter to bring claims in court unconscionable); Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000) (finding that a unilateral obligation to 
arbitrate is “itself so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable”); Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 382 (finding an arbitration clause invalid because it lacked a “modicum of bilaterality”). 
 346 Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 738, 750 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Green Tree 
Fin. Corp. v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409, 415 (Ala. 1999)). 
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contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at 
all.’”347 Radin does not mention the law’s special concern for the consumer in this 
situation. 
The law favors the consumer in other applications of the unconscionability 
defense to adhesive arbitration agreements. A good example is that an agreement 
under a number of decisionswill be tainted by substantive unconscionability absent 
sufficient mutuality. For example, where the contract gives the stronger party the 
choice of forums, including the courts, but where the contract restricts dispute 
resolution brought by the consumer just to arbitration.348 Indeed, an employer-
employee arbitration term in some jurisdictions creates a rebuttable presumption of 
substantive unconscionability.349 Furthermore, the standard form contract will be 
unconscionable—and subject to excision—where it includes a material, risk-shifting 
clause which the consumer would not reasonably expect to encounter in such a 
transaction.350  
Although Radin criticizes the allegedly low success rate of unconscionability 
claims—she calls it a “wild card” doctrine because of its purported “extreme 
unpredictability” 351—she cites no empirical data or case law statistics for this 
argument. Indeed, it would be passing strange if unconscionability claims were 
routinely successful against adhesion contracts. Although courts examine the terms 
of adhesion contracts with extra scrutiny, these agreements are “generally 
enforceable because it would be impractical to void every agreement merely because 
of its adhesive nature.”352 Thus, the seeming one-sidedness and perceived unfair 
advantage often seen with adhesion contracts must be construed to give breathing 
room to the practicalities of commerce and the vendor’s right of freedom of contract 
(discussed in Part VI below). In any event, available studies show a surprisingly 
significant success rate for all unconscionability claims—33%—with “the vast 
majority” of plaintiff victories occurring with standard form contracts.353 Based on 
these statistics, as stated by one commentator, the current case law on 
                                                                                                                                         
 347 Caplin Enters., Inc. v. Arrington, Nos. 2011-CA-01332-COA & 2011-CA-01932-COA, 
2013 WL 1878879, at *6 (Miss. Ct. App. May 7, 2013). 
 348 Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 228 (W. Va. 2012); see also 
Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286 (Tenn. 2004) (citing cases requiring mutuality principle 
of relief). But see id. at 287-88 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing cases 
rejecting the mutuality principle). 
 349 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003); Taylor, 142 S.W.3d 277. But see 
Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 367 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that to find a 
particular contract adhesive requires the employee to produce evidence that she would be 
unable to find suitable employment if she refused to sign the agreement). 
 350 Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 351 RADIN, supra note 3, at 124-129. 
 352 State ex rel. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Tucker, 729 S.E.2d 808, 821 (W. Va. 2012). 
 353 Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1096-98 (2006); see also 
Lonegrass, supra note 1 (number of claims for unconscionability has dramatically increased 
with plaintiffs prevailing in the years 2002 and 2003 in approximately 43% of the time with 
most claims addressing arbitration clauses). 
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unconscionability is “workable.”354 Accordingly, contrary to Radin’s portrayal, 
unconscionability is not an unpredictable wild card but is frequently an effective tool 
to ready merchant overreaching on mass market boilerplate agreements.  
VI. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND MUTUAL ASSENT 
Radin argues that “boilerplate alternative legal universes simply do not assimilate 
to freedom of contract.”355 Because our legal system adheres to the ideal of private 
ordering, she contends, the involuntary loss of consumer rights brought on by 
adhesion contracts means that authentic freedom of contract is no longer a core 
value. 356 She even indicates that World B contracts are “a new kind of serfdom” for 
the consumer.357 Notably, she does not limit this phenomenon to abusive mass 
market standard form contracts. Radin’s critique, however, does not capture the case 
law construing freedom of contract. 
A. Elements and Policy 
Under the concept of "freedom of contract,” “parties bargaining at arm’s-length 
may generally contract as they wish, subject only to traditional defenses such as 
fraud, duress, illegality or mistake.”358 Mutual assent and freedom of contract are 
closely aligned because freedom of contract cannot exist without mutual assent.359 
Public policy “strongly favors” freedom of contract360 because “it is in the best 
interest of the public not to restrict unnecessarily” this ability.361 Thus, a party’s 
ability to enter and enforce contracts both reflects and promotes liberty, but also 
increases the production of wealth to the benefit of the general welfare.362  
As stated in the decisions, “One does not have ‘liberty of contract’ unless 
organized society both forbears and enforces, forbears to penalize him for making 
                                                                                                                                         
 354 Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney's Fees as a 
Remedy for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 324 (2010). 
 355 RADIN, supra note 3, at 98. 
 356 Id. at 19, 56. 
 357 RADIN, supra note 3, at 92 (referencing cell phone contracts with AT&T). In the 
dictionary definition, “a person in a condition of servitude, required to render services to a 
lord, commonly attached to the lord's land and transferred with it from one owner to another.” 
Serfdom Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
serfdom?s=t. Query whether most independent observers would agree that a person entering 
an adhesion contract is akin to a serf.  
 358 Marcinczyk v. N.J. Police Training Com'n, 5 A.3d 785, 788-89 (N.J. 2010). 
 359 Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Mich. 
2003). 
 360 Green v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 727 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Accord Kunda 
v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 671 F.3d 464, 470 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 29 (Tex 
.Ct. App. 2010). 
 361 Trimble v. Ameritech Pub., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. 1998). 
 362 Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Del. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. b (1981) (“bargains are widely believed to be beneficial to the 
community in the provision of opportunities for freedom of individual action”). 
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his bargain and enforces it for him after it is made.”363 Other courts generally point 
out the need for freedom of contract to promote “[t]he necessary certainty, stability 
and integrity of contractual rights and obligations.”364 Indeed, respected 
commentators have argued that preserving party autonomy on whether to enter an 
agreement should be the primary goal of contract law.365  
Based on the above-quoted language, there are two aspects of freedom of 
contract. First, under the accountability component, parties must accept the 
consequences of their voluntary choices in ordering their personal affairs, which 
means that the general rule of freedom of contract includes the ability and need for a 
party to accept a bad bargain.366 This judicial self-restraint is so strong that courts 
hold that a contract must be interpreted and enforced as written, even though it 
contains terms that may seem harsh or unjust.367 Second, with the autonomy 
component, parties have the right to bind themselves legally; it is a judicial concept 
that contracts are based on mutual agreement and free choice, and should be 
unhampered by external controls such as governmental interference, except where 
the contract violates established law or public policy.”368 Perhaps even more 
importantly, liberty of contract is a fundamental individual right (subject to 
                                                                                                                                         
 363 Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 31 (Mich. 2005). 
 364 ARC LifeMed, Inc. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 
(quoting McCall v. Carlson, 172 P.2d 171, 187-88 (Nev. 1946)). 
 365 Charles Fried, Contract As Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 509 (1981). 
 366 Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) (also stating “a deal’s a 
deal”); see also Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Sur. Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 686 (W. Va. 
2005) (“Where parties contract lawfully and their contract is free from ambiguity or doubt, 
their agreement furnishes the law which governs them.”) (analyzing freedom of contract); 
Nawaz v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 91 So. 3d 187, 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is 
well settled that courts may not rewrite a contract or interfere with the freedom of contract or 
substitute their judgment for that of the parties thereto in order to relieve one of the parties 
from the apparent hardship of an improvident bargain.”). 
 367 See Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tenn. 2001). In El Paso 
Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas Co., 964 S.W.2d 54, 62 (Tex. App. 1997), rev’d on other 
grounds, 8S.W.3d 309 (Tex.1999), the court cautioned, 
Our court system cannot act as the mother hen watching over its chicks, standing 
ready to ameliorate every unpleasant circumstance which might befall them. One's 
right to negotiate a bargain, to exercise free will, to choose a path, and to even make a 
bad deal must be admitted and respected. 
See also Hillsboro Plaza Enters. v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating 
that courts may not make a new contract for parties who have spoken for themselves and may 
not relieve parties of their obligations simply because these obligations later prove to be 
burdensome or unwise).  
 368 J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ohio 2007) (Cupp, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); 
Marshall v. Kan. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 73 P.3d 120, 128 (Kan. 2003); In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 n.11 (Tex. 2004); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 154 (9th ed. 
2009). 
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governing law and other public policies) and is protected by the federal and various 
state constitutions.369  
Radin repeatedly leaves out the accountability element as she considers only the 
autonomy component of freedom of contract in her criticisms of mass market 
consumer contracting.370 Nevertheless, Radin raises a valid question about adhesion 
contracts: Can freedom of contract exist for contracts that many analysts believe 
have substantial barriers to being negotiable? The next section of the Article 
analyzes this issue. 
B. Freedom Of Contract and Adhesion Agreements 
Adhesion contracts are known for the reality that consumers generally do not 
read these agreements in any depth before signing them. Where a consumer 
knowingly signs such a form contract without reading or understanding it, a good 
argument exists that the consequences of the “duty to read” doctrine are consistent 
with the autonomy strand of freedom of contract. Robert E. Scott and Jody S. Kraus 
have commented,  
The duty to read doctrine provides individuals with an incentive not to 
sign agreements unless they have read and understood them first. In this 
sense, it increases the likelihood that enforceable agreements will be 
informed and thus serve the value of autonomy. By increasing the 
likelihood that agreements are mutually informed, this rule would also 
increase the probability that agreements enhance social welfare [(i.e., the 
consumer will be better off economically)].371 
Based on Scott and Kraus’s observation, the conclusion arises that the law in this 
way preserves the individual’s right of autonomy while advancing society’s interest 
in the enforcement of valid contracts.  
                                                                                                                                         
 369 See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (construing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution)); I.C.C. Protective Coatings, Inc. v. A.E. Staley 
Mfg. Co., 695 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (construing federal and Indiana 
constitutions); Am. Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 S.E.2d 92, 98 (N.C. 1986) 
(construing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 641 (2013) (“The 
freedom to contract is . . . safeguarded by the constitutions of most of the states.”). 
 370 See RADIN, supra note 3, at 19, 34-35, 56-59. Interestingly, an early commentator 
argued that standardized contracts actually promote freedom of contract because of the utility 
of tried and tested forms: 
The notion that standardization is necessarily inimical to real freedom is a fallacy of 
the same type as the one that habits are necessarily hindrances to the achievements of 
our desires. There is doubtless the real possibility of developing bad social customs, as 
we develop bad individual habits. But in the main, customs and habits are necessary 
ways through which our aims can be realized. By standardizing contracts, the law 
increases that real security which is the necessary basis of initiative and the 
assumption of tolerable risks. 
Cohen, supra note 40, at 589 (emphasis added).  
 371 ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 436 (4th ed. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
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As always, we must turn to the case law to inform this discussion. Although 
Radin has not analyzed the relevant decisions, it turns out that the case law discusses 
the relation of freedom of contract and adhesion contracts, most notably insurance 
policies.  
With respect to this contract type, the Michigan Supreme Court has argued 
emphatically that freedom of contract is indeed fully associated with adhesion 
contracts.372 In considering an insurance policy, the Michigan court observed: 
“When a court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own 
independent assessment of ‘reasonableness,’ the court undermines the parties' 
freedom of contract. . . .”373 Thus, this jurisdiction and others see no contradiction 
between adhesion contracts and the freedom of contract. 374 
If the contracting parties have truly manifested their assent to an adhesion clause 
in their contract, Radin’s attempt at channeling all similarly situated parties’ desires 
to her own philosophical viewpoint would damage the contracting system. 375 Where 
a party verifiably wishes to sign an adhesion contract, and fully manifests his desire 
to do so, then cutting off this choice deprives such parties of their freedom to 
contract irrespective of the view of outsiders that the person is making a poor choice. 
The irony here is that it is Radin’s standard prohibiting the latter arrangements that 
runs contrary to private ordering and which undermines the core value of freedom of 
contract.  
Nevertheless, several decisions uncited by Radin directly support her argument 
that mass market adhesive agreements can impair the consumer’s freedom of 
contract under the autonomy theory. Thus in a 1978 Illinois Court of Appeals case, 
the court said that “Freedom of contract simply does not exist” where the merchant 
draws up the terms and the consumer who merely ‘adheres' to it has little choice as 
                                                                                                                                         
 372 Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich. 2005). 
 373 Id. at 31. 
 374 See Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011) (“The freedom 
to contract is especially important in the insurance industry, as insurance policy terms are the 
primary means by which parties distribute and shift risk.”); Forecast Homes, Inc. v. Steadfast 
Ins. Co., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 213 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (California courts consistently 
admonish judges against rewriting insurance policy language to deny parties their general 
freedom to contract.). Many—but not all—courts recognize that insurance policies and 
binders are not ordinary contracts but are “contracts of adhesion.” Compare Berger v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 834 F.2d 1154, 1162 (3d Cir. 1987); Allen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 
638, 644 (N.J. 1965) (yes), with Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286, 288-89 n.1 (Colo. 
1981), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Friedland v. Travelers Indem. Co., 105 P.3d 639 
(Colo. 2005) (no). 
 375 Even assuming that consumers in this situation are making a poor choice, the law is: 
“‘People should be entitled to contract on their own terms without the indulgence of 
paternalism by courts [or commentators] in the alleviation of one side or another from the 
effects of a bad bargain.” Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985); see also Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant and benighted to 
fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”); Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 272 
N.W.2d 870, 875-76 (Iowa 1978) (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring specially) (“A jurist’s 
personal disdain for any particular clause is wholly irrelevant if the contracting parties have 
agreed to include it in their contract.”). 
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to its terms.”376 Another case observes that the “marketplace reality” suggests that 
freedom of contract in the sale of goods under an adhesion contract is actually 
“nonexistent.”377 Other courts state that the consumer has little freedom of contract 
when he has no real avenue to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract.378 In 
sum, a number of courts rule that the autonomy concept of freedom of contract is 
absent for standardized mass market consumer contracts because free choice is 
lacking—these courts reason that (1) the play of the market does not bring the parties 
together, (2) the parties do not meet each other on an approximately equal economic 
footing, and (3) the two sides do not enter their contract as the result of free 
bargaining.379  
                                                                                                                                         
 376 Tibbs v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 373 N.E.2d 492, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
 377 Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1990). 
 378 Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976). 
 379 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960); Price v. Gatlin, 
405 P.2d 502, 507 (Or. 1965); Gautreau v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 815, 818-
19 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 429 So. 2d 866 (La. 1983); see also Kessler, 
supra note 2, at 632 (observing that the weaker party needing goods or services is frequently 
not in a position to obtain better terms from alternative sources either because the supplier has 
a monopoly or because all suppliers use the same terms). Along similar lines, Peter Linzer 
observes,  
The great justifications of freedom of contract are the intrinsic value of the exercise of 
free will and the efficacy of individuals planning their individual lives as opposed to 
legislatures working en masse. Neither of these justifications has any relevance to 
contracts of adhesion. The mass marketing contract has nothing to do with freedom of 
contract: the non-dominant party has neither free will nor an opportunity for 
individual planning. 
Linzer, supra note 296, at 213. 
For a sampling of other cases disassociating freedom of contract and adhesion contracts, see, 
for example, Tibbs, 373 N.E.2d at 498 (“Freedom of contract simply does not exist in a typical 
relationship between an insurer and insured.”); Gonzalez v. Cnty. of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043, 
1046 (5th Cir. 1973) (recognizing that poor tenants, such as migrant farm workers, are often 
compelled to sign form leases “without any real freedom of contract”); First Ala. Bank v. First 
State Ins. Co., No. 83-G-2082-S, 1988 WL 192452, at *14 (N.D. Ala. May 26, 1988) 
(“Without bargaining the public policy favoring the freedom of parties to contract is not 
implicated.”); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (stating that 
consumer has only the freedom to adhere to the adhesive terms); Strauch v. Charles 
Apartments Co., 273 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (discussing freedom of contract 
illusory in form leases); Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 413 N.W.2d 178, 181 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“Freedom of contract . . . is a less persuasive factor when unequal 
bargaining power exists.”); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 383 P.2d 107, 112 (Or. 1963) 
(“[adhesive] contracts are regarded by some authorities as anachronistic or inconsistent with 
real freedom of contract”); Estep v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 882, 886 (N.M. 
1985) (opining that in consumer insurance transactions “to say there is freedom of contract ‘is 
to ignore reality’”); Pigman v. Ameritech Pub., Inc., 641 N.E.2d 1026, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1994) (discussing freedom of contract “illusory” with a contract of adhesion); Cate v. Dover 
Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1990) (Spears, J., concurring) (stating that the “marketplace 
reality” suggests that freedom of contract in the sale of goods is “actually nonexistent”). 
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Furthermore, Radin could have pointed out that the consumer’s weaker 
bargaining position has prompted some jurisdictions to institute a higher level 
judicial review and policing of the adhesion contract380 to help preserve freedom of 
contract.381 Thus, Radin could have maintained that the courts are realists about the 
potential that merchants can be tempted to go over the line of fair bargaining and 
therefore true freedom of contract is lacking in such a one-sided environment.  
In some respects, the debate over adhesion contracts and freedom of contract is a 
variation of the debate over whether consumers can give effective consent to a mass 
market form contract. Substantive arguments exist on both sides, but there are other 
considerations present in the freedom of contract setting that impact the proper 
resolution of this question. Radin would have strengthened her argument by 
rephrasing and making more precise the question as whether adhesion contracts 
sufficiently safeguard the parallel right of freedom from contract. The reason is that 
under some decisions, the consumer cannot obtain the needed product or service 
save by acquiescing in the form agreement.382 As Randy Barnett383 has noted, and as 
courts384 have observed, the law protects both freedom to contract and freedom from 
contract.  
The position that enforceable adhesion contracts reflect the parties’ freedom of 
contract carries the day. Radin (and courts in her camp) overlook that where, as here, 
the law widely approves a contract type, it would be anomalous to hold that a valid 
contract violates the right to freedom of contract.385 A contract on the same issues 
cannot be both consistent and inconsistent with public policy. Therefore, Radin’s 
analysis on this topic has some merit but more weighty shortcomings.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
In her concerted efforts to categorize mass market standard form contracts in 
terms of normative degradation,386 Radin has missed numerous lines of case law 
                                                                                                                                         
 380 See Pickering v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593 (R.I. 1971) (stating that there 
is a higher burden to declare forfeiture of consumer rights); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 383 
P.2d 107, 112-13 (Or. 1963). 
 381 Medovoi v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
(Thompson, J., concurring) (limiting adhesion contracts “necessary to preserve freedom of 
contract in fact”). 
 382 See supra Part II.B. 
 383 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821, 828 (1992) (“Freedom of contract entails both freedom to contract—the 
power to effect one's legal relations by consent—and freedom from contract—the immunity 
from having one's right to resources transferred without one's consent.” (emphasis added)). 
 384 Elda Arnhold & Byzantio, L.L.C. v. Ocean Atl. Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 705 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“Freedom not to contract should be protected as stringently as freedom to 
contract.”). 
 385 E.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); Feldman v. 
Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 386 Radin confines her analysis to mass market consumer standard form contracts but 
devotes almost no attention to the many business-to-business boilerplate contracts that 
constitute a significant portion of the American contracting system. The closest she comes is a 
footnote in Chapter One commenting that contracts between business entities “are more likely 
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authority that generally would have contradicted (but occasionally supported) her 
thesis. Some good examples of these oversights are (1) the division of authority on 
whether adhesion contracts fit within the mutual assent model, (2) her contention 
that courts rarely use the term “meeting of the minds” and that the phrase represents 
a pocket of subjectivity, (3) her failure to apply the plain meaning rule and the duty 
to read doctrine, (4) a contract of adhesion must at the very least be closely 
scrutinized by the court to determine its reasonableness, (5) her failure to recognize 
the contrasting arguments on freedom of contract in mass market adhesion contracts, 
and (6) the law in various ways favors the consumer in the application of the 
unconscionability defense to adhesive arbitration agreements. 
Because almost all courts regularly uphold adhesion contracts absent a 
recognized bargaining defect, the clear judicial message is that when it comes to this 
contract type, “The law will give enforcement where the contract is a legitimate 
statement of rights and duties.”387 Courts further emphasize that “Rational personal 
and economic behavior in the modern post-industrial world is only possible if 
agreements between parties are respected.”388 These decisions implement the general 
policy that wherever possible, courts should strive to uphold, rather than to defeat, an 
otherwise binding contract.389 Radin’s book does not appropriately consider these 
significant policies. 
Backed by numerous statutes and cases, I have provided a balanced analysis of 
the law’s role in supporting voluntary consent in standard form consumer 
contracting. Besides being the first full length critique of Boilerplate, this Article 
also has contributed original observations to the secondary literature, most 
prominently the existence of a division of authority on whether mutual assent and 
freedom of contract exist for adhesion contracts and I also provide a solution for the 
conflict. 390 
For all of her criticisms, Radin does not grapple with the question why at 
numerous key turns are the courts solidly aligned against her legal interpretations of 
                                                                                                                                         
to instantiate freedom of contract than those involving consumers.” RADIN, supra note 3, at 
251 n.6. Radin’s book would have benefited from a comparison of boilerplate consumer 
contracts with boilerplate business contracts. Many questions arise from this issue. For 
example: Can these boilerplate business contracts ever be “purported” contracts? Can a 
corporate business also be a “consumer” within Radin’s model, such as a small business single 
proprietorship? Do these boilerplate business contracts ever cause normative degradation? 
While Radin is entitled to establish the scope of her analysis, the answers to these questions 
would have broadened the value of her book. 
Interestingly, Radin teaches a class at the Michigan Law School on boilerplate, and the course 
description specifically mentions this issue. See http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
CurrentStudents/Registration/ClassSchedule/Pages/AboutClass.aspx?term=1920&classnbr=10
171 (“Should boilerplate used between commercial parties be treated differently from 
boilerplate between a firm and consumers?”). 
 387 Estrin Const. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981). 
 388 Dearnley v. Mountain Creek, No. A-5517-10T1, 2012 WL 762150, at *3 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. A.D. Mar. 12, 2012). 
 389 See supra note 209. 
 390 See supra Part IV.A., E. 
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mutual assent. Is her point that U.S. courts are the captives of corporate interests? 
Radin never gives a reason. Because the accurate recitation of legal principles is the 
predicate for any valid normative criticism of the contracting system, and especially 
considering that courts follow numerous pro-consumer doctrines, Radin has not 
succeeded in showing that boilerplate, standard form, or adhesion contracts have 
caused normative degradation.  
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